Accomplice Confessions and the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington Confronts Past Issues with a New Rule by Graham, Kjirstin
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 Symposium: Can the Ordinary Practice of Law
Be a Religious Calling?
Article 3
1-20-2005
Accomplice Confessions and the Confrontation
Clause: Crawford v. Washington Confronts Past
Issues with a New Rule
Kjirstin Graham
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kjirstin Graham Accomplice Confessions and the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington Confronts Past Issues with a New Rule, 32
Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (2005)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/3
Accomplice Confessions and the
Confrontation Clause: Crawford v.
Washington Confronts Past Issues
with a New Rule
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
AND ACCOMPLICE CONFESSIONS
A. The Development of Hearsay Law
B. Mattox v. United States: A First Look at Hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause
C. Douglas v. Alabama: Accomplice Confessions Problematic
Under the Confrontation Clause
D. Bruton v. United States: Confrontation Clause Concerns in
Joint Trials
E. Ohio v. Roberts: A Framework for Confrontation Clause
Analysis
III. INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS AND THE AGAINST PENAL
INTEREST EXCEPTION: ILLUSTRATING THE COURT'S STRUGGLE
WITH ACCOMPLICE CONFESSIONS AND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
A. The Court Grapples With "Interlocking" Confessions
1. Lee v. Illinois and the Interlocking Confession Cases
2. Idaho v. Wright: Reliability and the Anti-
Bootstrapping Rule
B. The Court Wrestles with the Against Penal Interest
Exception
1. Williamson v. United States: Dissecting the Hearsay
Exception
2. Lilly v. Virginia: Creating an Uncertain State of
Confrontation Doctrine
IV. AN OVERVIEW: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PRECEDENT AND ITS
CRITICISMS
V. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: CONFRONTING THE ISSUES WITH A
NEW RULE
A. The Confrontation Clause Applies to "Testimonial"
Statements
B. Unavailability and a Prior Opportunity for Cross-
Examination
C. The Chief Justice's Concurring Opinion
VI. CONCLUSION: CRAWFORD'S IMPACT AND AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE FOR CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE
A. "Testimonial" and "Police Interrogations"
B. Unavailability and a Prior Opportunity to Cross-Examine
C. The Interlock Theory May Still Have Vitality in the
Harmless Error Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine being tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison, or even death,
for a serious crime without the opportunity to cross-examine the
prosecution's chief witness in order to test the accuracy of his accusations.
This situation has occurred often in criminal prosecutions and is
demonstrated by the following hypothetical. Alan and Dan want to collect
on considerable debts that their long-time acquaintance Victor allegedly
owes them. The pair plans to go to Victor's apartment to see if they can
"talk" Victor into repaying the debt soon. Dan does not know where Victor
lives, so Alan agrees to take Dan to Victor's apartment for the purpose of
this "talk." While at Victor's apartment a verbal altercation between Dan
and Victor quickly ensues. Dan suddenly pulls a knife from his pocket and
fatally plunges it into Victor's chest. Dan and Alan flee Victor's apartment
and remain at Alan's home until the police later apprehend them. Alan and
Dan are arrested and taken to the station.
After waiving their Miranda rights, each separately agrees to give a
tape-recorded statement to the police. As the police interrogate him, Dan
tells police that he thought he saw Victor pull something from his pocket and
hold it in his hand when Dan stabbed Victor. Alan, by contrast, tells police
Victor had his empty hands splayed open as he was stabbed, but that Victor
may have reached into his pocket just after he was stabbed.
The state charges Dan with murder and charges Alan as an accomplice.
Dan is tried separately from Alan. At trial, the prosecution presents Dan's
tape-recorded confession. When the prosecution calls Alan, he invokes his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, rendering him
unavailable for examination. In lieu of his testimony, the state plays Alan's
tape-recorded confession from the police station. The trial judge admits this
evidence over a hearsay objection because Alan's statements regarding
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Victor's murder, having been made by an accomplice to the crime, are
against Alan's penal interest-one of the state's exceptions to the hearsay
rule. As a result, the jury disbelieves Dan's self-defense claim and convicts
him of the murder.
On appeal, Dan claims Alan's tape-recorded confession violated Dan's
right to cross-examine Alan and test the accuracy of his statements, as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Relying on
nearly a quarter century of Confrontation Clause precedent, the state
supreme court upholds the conviction, reasoning that Alan's confession is
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
The admissibility of out-of-court accomplice confessions, like Alan's,
has been a volatile issue in American jurisprudence. The issue is one of
great significance in criminal prosecutions because in many cases the
accomplice confession-which accuses the defendant and exonerates the
accomplice of the "worst part of their joint crimes"-is critical evidence for
the prosecution.' This crucial prosecution evidence often leads to
convictions of these defendants and the imposition of death sentences.2 For
these types of cases, where the prosecution needs "all admissible evidence"
and the defendant needs "every constitutional protection," the nation's
courts require clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court on
whether and when the United States Constitution sanctions the use of out-of-
court accomplice confessions against a criminal defendant.3
Following a line of somewhat unclear confrontation precedent, the
United States Supreme Court once again tackled Confrontation Clause issues
in Crawford v. Washington.4 The issue before the Court was whether an
out-of-court accomplice confession inculpating the defendant is admissible
under the Confrontation Clause on the basis that it overlaps (i.e. interlocks)
with the defendant's confession.5 On a broader level, the Court addressed
whether it should overhaul its current framework for analyzing the
admissibility of extra-judicial statements (i.e. hearsay) under the
Confrontation Clause.6 In a landmark decision, the Court sidestepped the
first issue and rested its decision on the latter issue, over-turning decades of
its own precedent to lay down a new Confrontation Clause framework.7
1. See Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v.
Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 92 (2003) (discussing the cases that followed a long line of




4. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
5. Id. at 1358-59.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 1370 (abrogating the Confrontation Clause framework that the Court established in
1980).
Part II of this comment discusses the historical background of the
Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and hearsay law, especially in
relation to the admissibility of accomplice confessions against the criminal
defendant. Part III illustrates the Court's struggle with the admissibility of
accomplice confessions through a discussion of how the Court grappled with
the issues of interlocking confessions and the "against penal interest"
exception to the hearsay rule. Part IV summarizes the state of the Court's
confrontation doctrine prior to Crawford and presents the main criticisms of
the doctrine. Part V outlines the background of Crawford v. Washington and
analyzes the opinions of the Court. Part VI concludes with an examination
of Crawford's impact on criminal prosecutions and the admissibility of
accomplice confessions.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND
ACCOMPLICE CONFESSIONS
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."' A criminal defendant's right to confront and question his
accusers face-to-face has "a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of
Western legal culture." 9 This common law right has roots in the laws of the
ancient Hebrews and Romans, both of which recognized the value of
ensuring a defendant's right to confront his accusers.' ° Today, the right of
confrontation generally involves a criminal defendant's right to cross-
examine those witnesses face-to-face while they are under oath and present
at trial."
"[T]he particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim" was
the English legal system's practice during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries of trying criminal defendants on evidence that "consisted solely of
ex parte affidavits or depositions."' 12  In lieu of live witnesses, the
prosecution's "evidence" consisted of out-of-court testimonial materials,
such as "reading depositions, confessions of accomplices, letters, and the
like; and this occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his
accusers, i.e. the witnesses against him, brought before him face to face."' 3
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988).
10. See id.; see also Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1171, 1202 (2002) (citing Deuteronomy 19:15-18 (establishing that both accuser and
accused must appear before the judge) and Acts 25:16 (explaining that Roman law provided an
opportunity for prisoners to defend themselves face to face with their accusers)).
11. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965). Thus, Confrontation Clause violations
may occur when the prosecution introduces statements by a witness who does not testify at all at
trial, or when the defendant's cross-examination of a witness is significantly restricted. See
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
12. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
13. Id. at 157 (citing SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 326 (1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sarah D. Heisler, My Brother, My Witness
Against Me: The Constitutionality of the "Against Penal Interest" Hearsay Exception in
Confrontation Clause Analysis, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 828 (2000).
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The notorious trial of Sir Walter Raleigh illustrates the problems with
this practice, particularly with its relevance to admitting non-testifying
accomplice statements against the defendant.' 4  In Raleigh's trial for high
treason, a confession letter written by Raleigh's co-conspirator Lord
Cobham, which implicated both himself and Raleigh in the treason plot, was
introduced as crucial evidence to convict Raleigh. 5 Despite Raleigh's
protests to be confronted with his accuser, whom he believed would now
testify in his favor, Lord Cobham was prevented from testifying according to
English law. 16 Even though Raleigh was denied an opportunity to confront
Lord Cobham in court, the confession letter was deemed sufficiently reliable
evidence because the confession was self-inculpatory, voluntary, and
consistent with parts of Raleigh's pre-trial statements.17
The decision of the Framers of the United States Constitution to include
the right of confrontation in the Sixth Amendment can be traced to the
common law's hardening against the abuses exemplified in Raleigh's trial. 18
At the core of this confrontation right was the defendant's opportunity for
adversarial testing of the evidence against him-to cross-examine his
accuser in order to test his knowledge, memory, and sincerity, under oath
and in front of thejury or judge.19
A. The Development of Hearsay Law
The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is often implicated
when the prosecution seeks to introduce statements made by witnesses
(declarants) outside the trial setting. 20 The "hearsay rule" is an evidentiary
principle long applicable to both criminal and civil litigation, and it
14. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (No.
02-94 10) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
15. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 13-14 (citing Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 How. St. Tr.
1, 24 (1809)).
16. Id. (citation omitted); Green, 399 U.S. at 157 n.10.
17. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 14 (citation omitted).
18. Green, 399 U.S. at 156-57 n.10 (citing F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951)); see
also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 411 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The plight of Sir
Walter Raleigh, condemned on the deposition of an alleged accomplice who had since recanted, may
have loomed large in the eyes of those who drafted that constitutional guarantee.").
19. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Heisler, supra note 13, at 828-29.
The Court later reiterated these protections in greater detail, noting that confrontation:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing him with
the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth"; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus
aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (citation omitted).
20. See Heisler, supra note 13, at 828-29.
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generally prohibits statements made out-of-court and offered by a litigant to
prove what the statement asserts.21  "The general prohibition against
admitting hearsay evidence reflects concerns about the reliability of out-of-
,,22
court statements not made under oath or tested by cross-examination.
Similarly, as the Confrontation Clause doctrine developed, the Court
recognized that "[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to
ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding
before the trier of fact."23 Hearsay also involves certain inherent risks: the
knowledge, memory, and sincerity of the declarant regarding his out-of-
court statement cannot be tested in front of the jury.24 The prohibition
against hearsay at trial and the Confrontation Clause, therefore, were
interpreted to protect similar values: trustworthiness of the evidence and
adversarial testing of the statements and the witnesses in court.
25
The hearsay rule has been codified in the evidence laws of American
jurisdictions, but there are many exceptions and hearsay is often allowed in
certain circumstances where the hearsay evidence is deemed "sufficiently
reliable to permit its introduction at trial.... ,26 The rationale behind these
hearsay rule exceptions often lies in the circumstances in which an out-of-
court statement is made. 7 Some hearsay statements are made under
circumstances that traditionally indicate that cross-examination of the
declarant in court would add little or nothing to the statements'
trustworthiness.28 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 803
includes exceptions to the hearsay rule that allow hearsay statements
"regardless of whether or not the declarant is available to testify. '29  In
contrast, FRE 804 includes exceptions that allow hearsay only when the
declarant is unavailable to testify.3 ° Hearsay listed under FRE 804 is
21. Andrew R. Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation
Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 160 (1983). See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801.
22. Keith Miles Aurzada, Casenotes: Evidence-FRE 804(b)(3): The Williamson Decision
Establishes a Bright-Line Rule that Invites Injustice and Cripples the Hearsay Exception for
Statements Against Penal Interest. Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994), 30 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 591, 594 (1995) (citations omitted).
23. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
24. Aurzada, supra note 22, at 594 n.34 (citing 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 245, at 93 (4th ed. 1992)); see also Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994) (citing
the risks that declarant may lie, misperceive, misremember, or be misunderstood).
25. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
26. Keller, supra note 21, at 161. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802, 803, 804.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 advisory committee's notes (setting out the rationales for various
exceptions to the hearsay rule).
28. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (excited utterances made spontaneously by the declarant who
is still under the stress of an exciting event); 804(b)(2) (declarations of an unavailable declarant who
believes his death is imminent); 804(b)(3) (statements against the declarant's interest). See also
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that some forms
of hearsay "are less subject to these hearsay dangers"); Aurzada, supra note 22, at 594 (making clear
that the reliable nature of some hearsay "acts as an acceptable substitute for the ordinary test of
cross-examination").
29. Aurzada, supra note 22, at 594; see also FED. R. EVtD. 803.
30. FED. R. EVID. 804; Aurzada, supra note 22, at 595.
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considered trustworthy only when the declarant is not available to testify,
and is founded upon "the policy that 'less is better than nothing' if the
testimony would be otherwise inadmissible.'
One such FRE 804 exception is a declarant's statement "against penal
interest. 32 For example, the FRE allows a hearsay statement made by an
unavailable declarant that "at the time of its making ... so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability" that the declarant "would
not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. '33 The rationale
behind this rule is that a person does not generally make statements
damaging to herself unless she is convinced they are true.34 In criminal
trials, this allows the prosecution to introduce as evidence against the
defendant statements made by unavailable third parties.
The general "statement against interest" exception was recognized at
common law.36 Controversy over the exception originated when the House
of Lords, in the Sussex Peerage Case of 1844, ruled that "the defendant
could not offer evidence of a confession to the crime made by another
person who was unavailable to testify. '37  United States jurisprudence
followed this ruling for many years with the purpose of "preventing the
admission of fabricated self-inculpatory statements made in order to
exculpate the accused. ' 38 Accordingly, the courts prohibited the admission
in criminal trials of hearsay confessions made by non-defendants. 39 This
practice changed somewhat after Justice Holmes' dissent in Donnelly v.
United States,4 ° wherein Justice Holmes doubted the propriety of a blanket
prohibition on third-party confessions.4' Following Donnelly, United States
3 1. Aurzada, supra note 22, at 595 (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (allowing also for statements by an unavailable third party
that are against that third party declarant's proprietary and pecuniary interest).
33. Id.
34. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
35. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
36. Aurzada, supra note 22, at 595; see also 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
318, at 340 (4th ed. 1992).
37. Aurzada, supra note 22, at 595.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. (discussing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277-78 (1913) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
41. See id. As Justice Holmes stated in Donnelly:
[T]he exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well
known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder, it is far
more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a
man ... I think we ought to give [the defendant] the benefit of a fact that, if proved,
commonly would have such weight.
Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
courts, along with federal and state statutes and rules, have incorporated
statements against penal interest as an exception the hearsay rule. 2
Despite the establishment of the against penal interest hearsay
exception, statements against interest that inculpate another person are still
traditionally viewed as unreliable. 43  First, the rationale that people will
generally not make statements damaging to their own interests breaks down
at the individual level, and it is through cross-examination of the individual
declarant that the inconsistencies and oddities of his statements are tested. 44
Second, in the context of long narrations, the part of the declarant's
statement that is against his interest is often collateral to the statements
inculpating the defendant, which are rarely against the declarant's interest.
45
Third, often the declarant, especially one in custody, has a motive to give
false statements, such as the desire to curry favor with the authorities or to
shift or spread blame to others out of revenge or in hopes of leniency from
the authorities. 46  Consequently, because of the reliability concerns
surrounding inculpatory statements against penal interest, many courts have
been reluctant to admit them as exceptions to the hearsay rule.47
In a typical criminal trial situation where the prosecution seeks to
introduce hearsay statements of an unavailable declarant against a defendant,
the prosecution must first establish that the proffered hearsay satisfies one of
the jurisdiction's recognized hearsay exceptions. 48 Then, once the evidence
is admitted under an exception, the prosecution must establish that the
hearsay does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 9 Concerns about the
42. Aurzada, supra note 22, at 595 (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
1477, at 360 nn.6-7 (Chadboum Rev. 1974). In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence, codifying the "against interest exception" for the Federal courts. Id. Washington,
Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Texas, and West Virginia are among the
states that recognize the against penal interest exception. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656,
662 (Wash. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 914 (2003), rev'd by 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004); see also
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 133 n.4 (1999) (listing a series of cases recognizing the against penal
interest exception in those states).
43. Keller, supra note 21, at 163.
44. Id. Some people willingly make statements against their interest to protect others. Others
feel that making the statement, while damaging on its face, will ultimately be helpful to them. See
infra note 46 and accompanying text. Still others are unaware that the statements they are making
are damaging to their self-interests. For example, when giving statements to the police, suspects
may not understand accomplice laws that place equal culpability for the crime on the accomplice and
the person who actually committed the most culpable acts. This same accomplice may believe he is
minimizing his culpability by revealing the complete criminal acts of his partner when in actuality
the accomplice is increasing his penal liability. See infra note 296 (noting that the accomplice would
benefit by limiting the defendant's liability in her statements to the police, but by increasing the
defendant's culpability, she potentially increased her own).
45. Keller, supra note 21, at 163.
46. id. at 163-64; see also Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 601 (1994).
47. Keller, supra note 21, at 164; see also Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133 n.4 (noting that some states do
not recognize any against penal interest exception and other states only prohibit the admission of an
accomplice confession against a criminal defendant).
48. Christine Noworyta, Admitting Confessions of Codefendants: Has Lee v. Illinois Created an
Additional Hearsay Exception?, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 435, 440 (1993).
49. See id.; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (holding that hearsay satisfied Idaho's residual
hearsay exception before addressing Confrontation Clause concerns); Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121-22
(noting that the defendant objected to the admission of hearsay under the against penal interest
322
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necessity for relevant evidence must be balanced against the competing
concern for reliability of the evidence and the defendant's right to confront
witnesses against him. 0 Thus, when a hearsay statement by a third party is
admitted against a criminal defendant under an against penal interest
exception, the statement must carry enough reliability to satisfy not just the
hearsay rule requirements but the Confrontation Clause requirements as
well.5 With its establishment in American jurisprudence, admission of
inculpatory statements under the "against interest" hearsay exception would
ultimately come to a complicated intersection with the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause.52
B. Mattox v. United States: 53 A First Look at Hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause
As early as the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the Confrontation Clause was not designed to "bar the
admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made by a
nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminate[d] the
defendant. 5 4 The Court first addressed the intersection of hearsay and the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause in Mattox v. United States.55 In
Mattox, two witnesses who had testified against the defendant in his first
trial died before his second trial, denying the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses during the second trial.56 The defendant
challenged the admission of the hearsay as a violation of his right to confront
those witnesses at his trial.57 The Court recognized that, while the
Confrontation Clause was primarily designed to protect criminal defendants
from being tried on depositions and ex parte affidavits, in certain situations
public policy and necessity for evidence in the case warranted that certain
statements from unavailable witnesses should be admitted, despite the
defendant's constitutional confrontation right. 58 The Court noted that the
exception and claimed that it violated his Confrontation Clause rights); Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605
(holding that because hearsay did not satisfy the against penal interest exception, the Confrontation
Clause issue did not need to be addressed).
50. Keller, supra note 21, at 161.
51. Id. at 161-62.
52. See generally Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116.
53. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
54. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240-44).
55. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 237; Heisler, supra note 13, at 828-29.
56. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 238.
57. Id. at 240.
58. Id. at 242-43. The Court determined that the Confrontation Clause provided the occasion:
[N]ot only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
Framers did not intend rigid construction of basic constitutional rights, but
that the spirit of the Constitution incorporated exceptions recognized at
common law.59
Moreover, the Court found that the substance of the Confrontation
Clause was satisfied where a criminal defendant had already had an
opportunity to cross-examine a witness at a former trial.60 In so holding, the
Court determined that confrontation rights did not extend so far as to allow
the accused to "go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of
that witness.' While never mentioning the term "hearsay," the Mattox
Court carved out the first hearsay exceptions to the Confrontation Clause,62
marking the Court's first deliberate step away from a Sixth Amendment
absolute requirement that a criminal defendant be able to confront and cross-
examine each witness against him in every trial.63
As a result, Mattox sparked the American legal system's struggle to
define the interplay between the Confrontation Clause's rule of
confrontation and the admission of hearsay against a criminal defendant.
64
The struggle extended to the state courts when, in 1965, the Supreme Court
in Pointer v. Texas65 made the Confrontation Clause applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
66
The Supreme Court maintained that the defendant's right to confront
and cross-examine one's accuser is the "greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth. 67 However, the Court continued to recognize the
need to carve out exceptional situations to the Clause's literal requirement of
confrontation in each criminal prosecution where hearsay was introduced.68
The Court developed its Confrontation Clause doctrine such that hearsay law
Id.; see also Heisler, supra note 13, at 829; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that
literal face-to-face confrontation with the witness may be overcome by the necessities of the case).
59. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. For example, the admission of dying declarations had long been
treated as competent evidence despite the defendant's lack of opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant at trial. Id. The rationale behind this exception was that a declarant is unlikely to tell a lie
in the moments just before he meets his Maker. See 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 1443.
60. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 245. The previous opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the
witnesses would give reliability to the hearsay statements because the statements had already been
subjected to adversarial testing. Id.; Heisler, supra note 13, at 828-29. The Court seemed to say
that, in form, the presence of the prior cross-examination in the first trial satisfied the Confrontation
Clause in the second trial. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 245.
61. Id. at 243.
62. The Court recognized that prior testimony with cross-examination and dying declarations
were exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 243-49.
63. Id. at 244-45; see also Heisler, supra note 13, at 829.
64. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817
(1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); see
also Heisler, supra note 13, at 829-30.
65. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
66. See id. at 403-04.
67. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (citation omitted). The Court also announced in Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970), that the mission of the Confrontation Clause was to advance the accuracy of the
truth-determining process by ensuring that the trier-of-fact has a sufficient basis for evaluating the
truth of a statement. Id. at 89.
68. Heisler, supra note 13, at 830.
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and the Confrontation Clause allowed for similar exceptions when hearsay
could be introduced without cross-examination of the declarant at trial.69
The link between confrontation doctrine and hearsay law was somewhat an
inevitable step assuming, as the Court maintained, that both were designed
to protect reliability of the evidence,7 0 and that both hearsay law and
confrontation doctrine also called for flexibility in order to allow for the
competing interests of the prosecution.7 1
Nevertheless, the Court flatly rejected the notion that the Confrontation
Clause and hearsay laws were one and the same.72 As confrontation
jurisprudence developed, though, the Court fielded criticism for increasingly
linking the Confrontation Clause and hearsay laws.73 The Court was
critiqued for abandoning the Confrontation Clause's original purpose of
testing the believability of the witness in front of the jury and for turning the
Clause into a reliability rule of evidence rather than an essential procedural
protection for criminal defendants.74 Critics argued that the Clause no
longer protected the accused with the tool of cross-examination, but merely
protected reliable evidence, a protection already afforded by the hearsay
rules to both the defense and the prosecution. 5 There is a fine line,
69. The development of similar exceptions is not surprising considering that the Confrontation
Clause and hearsay laws protected against similar risks. See Green, 399 U.S. at 156 (recognizing the
protection of similar values by the Confrontation Clause and hearsay laws).
70. Id. at 156.
71. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
72. As the Court stated in Green:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are
generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the
overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have
more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in
issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception.... The converse is
equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established
hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been
denied.
Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56 (citations omitted).
73. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring); White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 358-66 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); Kirst, supra note 1, at 103; James B. Haddad,
Criminal Law Symposium: Future Trends in Criminal Procedure: The Future of Confrontation
Clause Developments: What Will Emerge When the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse Lines of
Confrontation Decisions?, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 78 (1990); Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 14, at 33.
74. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 558 (1988) (critiquing the Court's construction that the Confrontation
Clause's purpose is to protect reliability and accuracy of the evidence, which turns the Clause into
nothing more than a "minor adjunct to evidence law"); John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility:
Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 191, 194 (1999) (criticizing the Court for turning confrontation questions involving hearsay
into a reliability analysis); see also infra notes 271-78 and accompanying text.
75. Jonakait, supra note 74, at 580-81.
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however, between testing the believability of the witness through cross-
examination and the Court's construction of the Clause, which advanced the
76
accuracy of the witness' statements.
Therefore, it was not inconceivable that the Court, following Mattox and
other early confrontation cases, would continue to focus on reliability as a
necessary requirement for Confrontation Clause purposes. 7' As the Court
pushed forward with this focus in mind, the admissibility of out-of-court
accomplice confessions provided a vivid picture of the Court's struggle to
define a comprehensive theory of the relationship between hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause.
C. Douglas v. Alabama: 78 Accomplice Confessions Problematic Under the
Confrontation Clause
Douglas v. Alabama involved one of the Court's first encounters with
the admissibility of accomplice confessions under the Confrontation
Clause.79  The trial court admitted the accomplice confession against the
defendant, which implicated both the accomplice and the defendant in the
alleged crime, identified the defendant as the one who shot and wounded the
victim, and provided the prosecution's "crucial link" to the government's
case against the defendant.80
The defendant in Douglas challenged the admission of his accomplice's
confession as a violation of his Confrontation Clause right, and the Court
agreed, reversing the defendant's conviction. 8  The Douglas Court
recognized that custodial accomplice confessions, which accuse the
defendant of the same or more serious crime and are presented to the jury by
76, See id. at 584-88 (conceding that it may appear that accuracy of the evidence is consistent
with the Clause's original purpose of allowing assessment of the witness' believability).
77. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1373 (2004) (noting that, while the
Confrontation Clause is concerned with reliability, the courts below were misguided in their method
of finding reliability, because in certain situations, cross-examination is the only method for
establishing reliability).
78. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
79. Id. at 417. The Court also took the opportunity to determine the permissible interpretations
of a declarant's unavailability at trial. Id. at 420. When called as a witness at trial, the accomplice
invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Id. at 416. The Douglas Court held that, if a
witness invokes his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, he is deemed unavailable for
cross-examination. Id. at 420. Determining the parameters of a declarant's unavailability was a
necessary component of confrontation doctrine development because, as the Mattox Court noted, the
declarant's unavailability not only results in the defendant's denial of confrontation, but may also
represent a factor in the prosecution's need for the evidence, which might otherwise be lost without
the declarant's statements. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). The
declarant's unavailability is thus important to the Mattox Court's focus on balancing the need for the
evidence with the defendant's confrontation rights, and the declarant's unavailability often cuts both
ways in this balancing analysis. See id. A declarant is deemed unavailable in a variety of other
circumstances. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (three-year old child's young
age rendered her incompetent to testify); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980) (declarant is
unavailable if prosecution establishes that good faith effort failed to locate declarant); Mattox, 156
U.S. at 260-61 (death renders a declarant unavailable); see also Heisler, supra note 13, at 830.
80. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419.
81. See id. at 420,423.
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law enforcement, pose problems for a defendant's confrontation right.82 In
Douglas, presentation of this testimony by law enforcement, without a
response from an "unavailable" accomplice, served to indicate the truth of
the underlying confession. 83 The defendant was entitled to his constitutional
right to cross-examine the accomplice in order to establish whether the
statement made by the accomplice was true.84
Furthermore, the language of Douglas suggested that the key factor in
reversing the defendant's conviction was the weight that the accomplice
confession added to the prosecution's case.85 The accomplice confession
was crucial evidence, seemingly uncorroborated by statements from the
defendant or other testimony. 86 Implicit in the Court's reasoning was that,
had the accomplice confession been corroborated by other constitutionally
admissible evidence, the Confrontation Clause violation might have been "a
mere minor lapse" and not reversible error.87 Douglas cast doubt on the
reliability of accomplice confessions and focused on their harmfulness as
key prosecution evidence, previewing the Court's preference for in-court
cross-examination of the accomplice. 88
D. Bruton v. United States:89 Confrontation Clause Concerns in Joint Trials
The Court echoed its Douglas sentiments in Bruton v. United States.90
In Bruton, the defendant and his codefendant were tried jointly for armed
postal robbery.9' The trial court allowed the postal inspector to testify about
the codefendant's pre-trial confession, subject to a limiting instruction that
the jury not consider the confession against the defendant.92 On appeal, the
Court overturned the defendant's conviction, reasoning that the risk was too
82. The trial court allowed the prosecution to read the entire accomplice confession in front of
the jury and, on appeal, the Court equated the prosecution's reading of the accomplice's confession
document with actual testimony by law enforcement. Id. at 419. See id. at 419-20 (holding that the
in-court testimony of three law enforcement officers, identifying the confession as having been made
by the accomplice, "enhanced the danger" that the jury would treat the accomplice's refusal to
answer as indicating the truth of his confession); see also Heisler, supra note 13, at 832.
83. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420.
84. Id.
85. Id.; Keller, supra note 21, at 165.
86. See Douglas, 380 U.S. at 416-23 (discussing the substantial weight the accomplice
confession added to the prosecution's case without mentioning any corroborating evidence).
87. Id. at 420; see also Keller, supra note 21, at 165.
88. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419-20.
89. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 124.
92. Id. at 125 n.2. There was no domestic hearsay exception, such as an against penal interest
exception, to admit the codefendant confession directly against the defendant, and thus the jury
could only consider the confession against the codefendant himself. Id.
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great that the jury would consider the codefendant's confession against the
defendant. "
The Bruton Court expressed two concerns regarding accomplice
confessions and a defendant's confrontation rights: 1) the unreliability of the
accomplice confessions and 2) the harmfulness of the accomplice
confessions if admitted without corroborating evidence in violation of the
Confrontation Clause. 94 The Court first pointed out that, without cross-
examination, the jury could not determine if the confession was true or if it
was an attempt to transfer blame to the defendant, and "it was against such
threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed. 95
Consequently, the Court held confessions by accomplices and codefendants,
un-tested by cross-examination, to be unreliable evidence.
96
Moreover, within its reasoning, the Court once again reiterated its
concerns from Douglas that the "introduction of [the codefendant's]
confession added substantial... weight to the Government's case in a form
not subject to cross-examination. 97 Thus, the Bruton analysis may perhaps
be taken a step further because of the Court's emphasis on the importance of
the codefendant's confession to the defendant's conviction.98 At least one
legal analyst argued that Bruton could be construed to prohibit in any trial
the admission of an accomplice confession against a defendant if it adds
substantial weight to the prosecution's case-that is, when there is a lack of
evidence corroborating the confession.99 However, it is unclear whether the
Bruton Court intended the lack of corroboration to be a factor in finding a
violation of the Confrontation Clause or a factor in the analysis of whether
the confrontation rights violation was harmless error.1°°
93. Id. at 136-37. Therefore, admission of the codefendant's confession at the joint trial
amounted to a de facto admission against the defendant, which violated the defendant's
constitutional right to cross-examine his alleged accomplice as to the trustworthiness of his
statements. Id. Bruton thus established the rule that in joint trials the Confrontation Clause
prohibited admitting a codefendant's confession, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the
statement as to the defendant. See id. at 137. One year after its Bruton decision, the Court was faced
with a Bruton error, but affirmed the defendant's conviction after concluding that the error was
harmless. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
94. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136-37.
95. Id. at 136.
96. See id. at 136-37 ("The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the
alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination.").
97. Id. at 127-28.
98. Id. at 136-37.
99. Keller, supra note 21, at 167 (restating the Bruton rule as "[o]nly if other evidence in a
constitutionally admissible form establishes the same facts to a sufficient degree can the inculpatory
statement against penal interest be admitted"). This rule would apply in all trials because the Bruton
Court only relied upon the joint trial factor when discussing the adequacy of jury instructions. Id.;
see Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36.
100. Compare Keller, supra note 21, at 173 (noting a similarity between the author's Bruton
"substantial weight" rule and the harmless error rule), with James B. Haddad & Richard G. Agin, A
Potential Revolution in Bruton Doctrine: Is Bruton Applicable Where Domestic Evidence Rules
Prohibit Use of a Codefendant's Confession as Evidence Against a Defendant Although the
Confrontation Clause Would Allow Such Use?, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 235, 242 (1990)
(noting that the "devastating" effect that admission of the codefendant's confession had on the
defendant's case was a factor in finding a violation of the defendant's right of confrontation).
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The Court also reserved the question of whether an accomplice
statement is itself admissible directly against the defendant in a separate trial
if domestic hearsay law in fact permits it."°' This issue would emerge more
prominently in the Court's later accomplice confession cases implicating the
Confrontation Clause. 10 2  The Court previewed its future opinions by
indicating that an accomplice confession may be admissible under an
applicable hearsay exception, even though the defendant still lacked an
opportunity to cross-examine the accomplice and test the reliability of the
evidence.103 Thus, while Bruton focused on the inherent unreliability and
harmfulness of accomplice confessions, the Court reserved for future cases
the issue of whether statements admitted under traditional hearsay
exceptions might satisfy the Confrontation Clause.'4
E. Ohio v. Roberts:'05 A Framework for Confrontation Clause Analysis
The Court solidified its "reliability" focus, evidenced in its early
confrontation cases, when in Ohio v. Roberts it established a universal
101. Keller, supra note 21, at 168. The Court avoided a broad constitutional holding by stating,
"There is not before us ... any recognized exception to the hearsay rule ... and we intimate no view
whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause." Bruton,
391 U.S. at 128 n.3. Introduction of a statement at a joint trial may be more prejudicial because the
two defendants stand side-by-side, the same jury hears all the evidence against each defendant, and
there is also a risk that the jury may draw improper inferences from the declarant's refusal to answer,
even though this is only a factor in determining the weight the statement gives to the prosecution's
case. Keller, supra note 21, at 167.
In reserving this question, the Court appeared to contradict the rationale implicit in its
reasoning. Haddad & Agin, supra note 100, at 242. On the one hand the Court held that excluding a
jointly tried codefendant's confession against a defendant through a mere limiting instruction
nevertheless violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136-37.
On the other hand, the Court did not determine whether the Confrontation Clause is violated when
an accomplice's confession is directly admitted against the defendant, such as in separate trials
where the accomplice confession is admitted against the defendant under an against penal interest
exception. See Keller, supra note 21, at 167; see also Haddad & Agin, supra note 100, at 242.
102. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1372-73 (2004) (deciding whether an
accomplice confession admitted under an against penal interest exception could satisfy the
Confrontation Clause); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999) (same).
103. Haddad & Agin, supra note 100, at 242. Justice Stewart, who wrote a concurring opinion in
Bruton, advised a more universal holding:
[Clertain kinds of hearsay are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to
discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it
logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give .... It is for this very
reason that an out-of-court accusation is universally conceded to be constitutionally
inadmissible against the accused, rather than admissible for the little it may be worth.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice
Stewart diverged from his Bruton opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), indicating that
some accomplice confessions made post-arrest may be admitted against a defendant without cross-
examination where the confession is admissible under domestic hearsay laws. Id. at 82-83; see also
Haddad, supra note 73, at 97 (recognizing the anomaly presented in Bruton).
104. Keller, supra note 21, at 167-68.
105. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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framework for analyzing hearsay under the Confrontation Clause. 10 6  In
Roberts, the Court was "called upon to consider once again the relationship
between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule with its many
exceptions.' 1 7  The Roberts Court re-emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause could not be rigidly applied because such an application "would
abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as
unintended and too extreme,"' 1 8 but noted that in upholding the accuracy of
evidence, the Clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial."'109 The Court then established a two-step process for determining the
admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause." 0
The Court's decision became known as the "Roberts Test.""' Under the
Roberts Test, hearsay satisfied the Confrontation Clause if the prosecution 1)
produces the declarant or proves that the declarant is unavailable 1 2 and 2)
the hearsay statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability."... 3 A statement
bears adequate indicia of reliability if the evidence falls "'within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception,"' or if the statement carries "'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness' such that adversarial testing would be
expected to add little, if anything, to [its] reliability."' 14 The Court did not
106. Id. at 65; see also Heisler, supra note 13, at 833.
107. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62. In Roberts, the defendant was convicted of forgery, but his
conviction was later reversed when the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the prosecution's use of
an unavailable witness' preliminary hearing testimony violated the defendant's right of
confrontation. Id. at 58-61. When the State of Ohio appealed, the Supreme Court reinstated the
conviction, finding that the witness was unavailable after a good faith search to locate her and that
her preliminary hearing statement was sufficiently trustworthy because the defendant had an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness while she had been under oath at the hearing. Id.
at 65-66, 72-73. It is significant to note that, in two of its major Confrontation Clause decisions
involving unavailable witnesses, the Court found no violation of the Clause where there was a
former opportunity to cross-examine the declarant who was under oath. See id.; Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 245 (1895).
108. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 65.
Ill. See, e.g., Noworyta, supra note 48, at 441; see also Mary Beth Martin, Idaho v. Wright: The
Confrontation Clause's Limitation on the Use of Corroborating Evidence in the Child Abuse
Context, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 225, 237-40 (1991).
112. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. However, the Court noted that the demonstration of unavailability
might not always be required where the "utility of trial confrontation" was minimal. Id. at 65 n.7.
For example, excited or spontaneous utterances and statements made by a patient for the purpose of
medical diagnosis is hearsay that is reliable because of the circumstances under which those
statements are made. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) & (2) advisory committee's notes. Even if the declarant
is available to testify at trial, the factors that contribute to the reliability of excited utterances and
medical diagnosis statements "cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony." White v.
Illinios, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992).
113. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (citation omitted).
114. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1999) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). Despite its
rejection that the Clause remained a distinct rule apart from the hearsay rule, the Court for the first
time recognized a direct relationship between hearsay rules and the Clause. See Jonakait, supra note
74, at 573 (pointing out that even the language of the second reliability prong of Roberts seems to
borrow language from the "residual exception" to the hearsay rule). Compare FED. R. EvID. 807
(providing that hearsay that does not fall within a traditional hearsay exception may still be
admissible if it carries "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"), with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66
(hearsay is reliable if it falls within a firmly rooted exception or has "particularized guarantees of
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define "firmly rooted," nor did it set forth a standard for the lower courts to
determine particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,"H5 but the Roberts
Test provided a framework for courts to determine the reliability, and thus
admissibility, of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause."1
6
The Court later refined its Roberts Test, establishing in White v.
Illinois' that "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of
reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the
Confrontation Clause is satisfied." ' 1 8  Accordingly, the Court equated
satisfaction of a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception with satisfaction of the
Confrontation Clause requirements, regardless of the declarant's availability
to testify.' 9 The Court reasoned that certain hearsay statements satisfying
firmly rooted exceptions are made under circumstances providing such
trustworthiness "that cross-examination would add little or no value" at
trial. 20 Thus, the trustworthiness of a firmly rooted hearsay statement was a
substitute for face-to-face confrontation at trial.121
trustworthiness"). However, in one case the Court found that a hearsay statement admissible under a
residual hearsay exception nevertheless violated the Confrontation Clause. Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
115. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. In an opinion that pre-dated Roberts, the Court did identify factors
"widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there
is no confrontation of the declarant." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1990). The factors
included:
(1) [W]hether the hearsay statement contained an express assertion of past fact, (2)
whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the fact asserted, (3) whether the
possibility that the statement was based upon a faulty recollection is remote in the
extreme, and (4) whether the circumstances surrounding the statement make it likely that
the declarant fabricated the assertion of fact.
Anthony v. Dewitt, 295 F.3d 554, 563 (6th Cir. 2002) (paraphrasing the Dutton factors) (citing
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89).
116. Heisler, supra note 13, at 834.
117. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
118. Id. at 356. The Court effectively did away with the requirement of declarant unavailability,
the "necessity" prong of the Roberts Test, in cases where hearsay fell within a firmly rooted
exception. id.; see also Jonakait, supra note 74, at 559 (noting that "[r]ecent decisions indicate that
the reliability branch survives, but the general unavailability requirement has been jettisoned").
119. See White, 502 U.S. at 356-57. The Court had previously found that firmly rooted exceptions
were those types of hearsay that longstanding judicial and legislative experience recognized as
trustworthy. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817. Later, however, the White Court noted that its decision in
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), limited the Roberts unavailability requirement to those
cases when the challenged hearsay statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.
White, 502 U.S. at 354.
120. Heisler, supra note 13, at 838; White, 502 U.S. at 355-56.
121. See White, 502 U.S. at 355-56. For example, excited utterances and statements made for
medical diagnosis are made trustworthy by the circumstances surrounding their making, which
cannot be recaptured in later court testimony. Id. As the Court noted:
A statement that has been offered in a moment of excitement-without the opportunity to
reflect on the consequences of one's exclamation-may justifiably carry more weight
with the trier or fact than a similar statement offered in the relative calm of the
courtroom. Similarly, a statement made in the course of procuring medical services,
where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or
The Court noted, however, that in the case of hearsay in which an
accomplice inculpates the defendant, testimony is preferred because cross-
examination is most effective for "the discovery of truth."' 12  Beyond this
observation, White failed to provide further guidance on the admissibility of
accomplice confessions because the facts of the case did not involve that
type of hearsay. 23  Constitutional admissibility of accomplice confessions
against criminal defendants continued to flounder in the murky waters of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 124
With the general confrontation framework established, the Court
allowed succeeding confrontation cases to slowly develop the particulars of
constitutional reliability based upon the facts each case presented, including
cases involving the admissibility of accomplice confessions. 25  However,
following Roberts and White, the Court's new framework received criticism
for solidifying the link between hearsay and the Confrontation Clause and
eroding criminal defendants' confrontation rights. 26 Two issues relating to
mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier or fact may not think
replicated by courtroom testimony.
Id. at 356.
122. Id. at 356; Heisler, supra note 13, at 838-39. After White, the unavailability requirement of
Roberts was only relevant in those cases not involving a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See White,
502 U.S. at 356. The Court's distinction for accomplice confessions suggested that any supposed
trustworthiness surrounding out-of-court accomplice confessions would not likely be a sufficient
substitute for cross-examination at trial. Id.
123. See White, 502 U.S. at 348, 356.
124. See generally Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); see also Natalie Kijurna, Lilly v.
Virginia: The Confrontation Clause and Hearsay-"Oh What a Tangled Web We Weave .... ", 50
DEPAUL L. REv. 1133, 1187 (2001) (explaining that the Confrontation Clause lies in a "convoluted
status" and lower courts will have difficulty in "deciding what hearsay rule may trump the
procedural right to confrontation"); Kirst, supra note 1, at 88 (describing Lilly as fractured and
fragmented). Even after the Court decided Lilly in 1999, lower courts continued to apply the Court's
confrontation doctrine in many different ways and awaited further guidance from the Supreme Court
on key confrontation questions. Id. at 104.
125. See Kirst, supra note 1, at 144 (recognizing that, even as late as 2003, the Court had yet to set
forth guidance to the lower courts "for identifying possible guarantees of trustworthiness"). This led
to a slew of confrontation opinions revealing inconsistency among the lower courts on reliability
issues surrounding accomplice confessions. See id. at 144-48 (criticizing the open-ended standard
established by Roberts and predicting that the inconsistency problems might be avoided by defining
specific grounds of trustworthiness for different categories of hearsay).
126. Justice Thomas took the opportunity in White to criticize the Court for increasingly linking
the Confrontation Clause to hearsay laws. White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas believed that the Court's interpretation that the Confrontation Clause "bars only unreliable
hearsay" was inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause. Id. at 363 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Reliability, he argued, is properly an issue of due process and not confrontation. Id. at
364 (Thomas, J., concurring). Instead, the "federal right of confrontation extends to any witness
who actually testifies at trial," and is "implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions." Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court was also critiqued for limiting the role
of the Confrontation Clause as a protection for the criminally accused. See Jonakait, supra note 74,
at 575 (critiquing the Court for using the definition of hearsay to determine when the Clause is
implicated and choosing a reliability test that "cedes superiority to hearsay doctrine"); Douglass,
supra note 74, at 195, 206 (noting that while the Court insists that the Clause has a life apart from
hearsay, "the Court has doomed [the Clause] to redundancy with the law of evidence" and created
"an exclusionary rule that excludes very little"). As long as the Court's decisions centered on the
proposition that the primary mission of the Clause was to further the accuracy of the truth-finding
process, a goal akin to that of evidence law, evidence law would dominate the right of confrontation.
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admissibility of accomplice confessions under the Confrontation Clause
seemed to plague the Court and signal major reform of its confrontation
theory, even fairly soon after its Roberts decision: interlocking
confessions 27 and the against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule.
28
III. INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS AND THE AGAINST PENAL INTEREST
EXCEPTION: ILLUSTRATING THE COURT'S STRUGGLE WITH ACCOMPLICE
CONFESSIONS AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. The Court Grapples With "Interlocking" Confessions
1. Lee v. Illinois129 and the Interlocking Confession Cases
Six years after Roberts, the Court again faced the two issues of
reliability and harmfulness that were raised in Bruton.3 ° In Lee v. Illinois,
neither of the jointly-tried murder defendants testified at trial, but both
defendants gave statements to the police that were substantially similar or
"interlocking"; both confessions admitted that the codefendant stabbed the
first victim and that the defendant had stabbed the second victim., 3' The two
confessions differed in that the codefendant suggested that both defendants
premeditated the killings, whereas the defendant claimed self-defense.1
3 1
The prosecutor relied heavily upon the codefendant's written custodial
confession in order to convict the defendant of both murders. 133 The appeals
court affirmed, holding that the codefendant's confession was sufficiently
See Jonakait, supra note 74, at 575-78 (noting that confrontation jurisprudence is "scanty" compared
to generations of "accumulated evidentiary wisdom"). As such, the Court rendered the
Confrontation Clause a mere "anachronism," outmoded by evidence law. Id. at 578.
127. See infra notes 129-173 and accompanying text. Interlocking confessions occur where the
defendant and accomplice give such similar confessions that they are said to "interlock." See State
v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 914 (2003), rev'd by 124 S. Ct.
1354 (2004). Some courts have used the interlocking nature of the accomplice confession (i.e. one
that is corroborated by the defendant's own confession) to establish reliability. See id. at 663-64
(relying on the interlocking nature to admit an accomplice confession).
128. See infra notes 174-254 (discussing the Court's struggle with this exception).
129. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 534-36.
132. Id. at 535. Specifically, the codefendant told the police that he and the defendant had
previously discussed a plan to "do something" to both victims, suggesting a premeditated plan to
kill. Id. In contrast, the defendant's statement indicated that the codefendant spontaneously
"snapped" and killed the first victim while the defendant killed the second victim in self-defense. Id.
133. Id. at 538.
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reliable, despite the defendant's inability to cross-examine the codefendant
at trial, because the confession "interlocked" with the defendant's.
34
Utilizing the Roberts framework, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the hearsay confession failed to satisfy the Confrontation Clause
because the codefendant's statement, as an accomplice confession, "was
presumptively unreliable and... did not bear sufficient independent 'indicia
of reliability' to overcome that presumption." 35  Particularly, the Court
found that the circumstances surrounding the codefendant's confession
"uniquely threatened" the "truthfinding function of the Confrontation
Clause," because "'the arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally
been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to
implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements





Moreover, the Court rejected the State's contention that because the two
confessions "interlocked" or overlapped to a great extent, the codefendant's
confession was thus trustworthy in its entirety.1 37  Rejecting what it called
"selective reliability," the Court held that an accomplice "confession is not
necessarily rendered reliable simply because some of the facts it contains
'interlock' with the facts in the defendant's statement."'138 Thus, "when the
discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the codefendant's
confession may not be admitted."'
' 39
The facts of Lee did not raise the question of whether sufficiently
corroborated confessions are admissible, but the Court pointed out that
"[o]bviously, when codefendants' confessions are identical in all material
respects, the likelihood that they are accurate is significantly increased."
40
134. Id. The Illinois Appeals Court declined to explain why or how the "interlocking" nature of
the codefendant's confession distinguished the case from Bruton and satisfied the Confrontation
Clause, even though both involved joint trials. Id.
135. Id. at 539.
136. Id. at 541 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
The Court noted that the codefendant gave his confession only after he had been told that the
defendant, Lee, had already implicated him in the murders. Id. at 544. Furthermore, the
codefendant may have had a motive to spread the blame to Lee because "once partners in a crime
recognize that the 'jig is up,' they tend to lose any identity of interest and immediately become
antagonists, rather than accomplices." id. at 544-45. Dissenting from the majority, Justice
Blackmun, with whom then-Justice Rehnquist joined, focused on the against penal interest nature of
the codefendant's confession. Id. at 551 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices found
that, while accomplice confessions are generally suspect because they tend to minimize the
declarant's culpability, the codefendant's confession at issue was sufficiently reliable because the
confession was "thoroughly and unambiguously adverse to his penal interest." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters believed that the confession fell within that class of declarations against
penal interest that are generally reliable and fall "squarely within established hearsay exceptions,"
because instead of minimizing his liability, the codefendant equally damaged his own defense by
telling police that both he and the defendant plotted the victims' murders. Id. at 552-53 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 545.
138. Id. (citing Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 79 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
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It might be inferred from the Court's language that when the discrepancies
between interlocking statements are insignificant, the accomplice confession
carries the necessary constitutional reliability. 141  In Lee, however, the
accomplice confession detailing the defendant's participation in the
premeditated planning of the murders clearly diverged from the defendant's
otherwise interlocking confession, rendering the confession incapable of
overcoming the presumption of unreliability. 1
42
The holding of Lee was significant to cases involving accomplice
confessions because of the Court's emphasis on the presumptive
unreliability of custodial confessions that inculpate the defendant.
143
However, the Court did not establish a per se ban on the admission of
accomplice statements, keeping the door open for the admissibility of
accomplice confessions against a defendant and agreeing that the
presumption of unreliability may be overcome in circumstances differing
from the facts of Lee.' 44 As recognized by the Court that same year in New
Mexico v. Earnest,145 its holding in Lee overruled Douglas v. Alabama'46 to
the extent that Douglas held that the Confrontation Clause mandated an
opportunity for a criminal defendant to cross-examine a codefendant
regarding his out-of-court statement, either at the time of the statement's
making or at trial. 14 Rather, the prosecution is "entitled to an opportunity to
overcome the weighty presumption of unreliability attaching to codefendant
statements by demonstrating that the particular statement at issue bears
sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns."'
148
Lacking clarity, though, was the question of whether the "indicia of
reliability" of an accomplice confession may be inferred because it
interlocks with the defendant's own confession that is admitted at trial. 149
141. Brief for Respondent at 6, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (No. 02-9410)
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
142. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 545.
143. See id.at 541.
144. See id. at 543. Lee stepped even further in this direction than did Bruton, which precluded
admission of codefendant confessions in jointly tried cases and merely reserved the question of
accomplice confession admissibility in separate trials for another day. See Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968). Lee suggested that a confession by an accomplice or codefendant may be
admissible in a separate or joint trial depending on the statement's content and the context in which
it is given. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 543.
145. 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (per curiam).
146. 380U.S.415 (1965).
147. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist noted that although, since
Roberts, the Court had not yet set forth specific standards for determining the constitutional
admissibility of hearsay, "lack of cross-examination is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of
evidence under the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
149. See State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 914 (2003)
(questioning on appeal whether an accomplice confession is admissible under the Confrontation
Clause to the extent it interlocks with the defendant's own confession), rev'd by 124 S. Ct. 1354
(2004).
Earnest and Lee highlighted the Court's struggle with the admissibility of
accomplice confessions that interlock with the defendant's own
confession.150  Then-Justice Rehnquist, who wrote a concurring opinion in
Earnest, relied on Lee's language addressing the interlock issue to suggest
that the codefendant's statement might be sufficiently reliable if it interlocks
with a defendant's confession absent any significant discrepancies bearing
on the defendant's participation in the crime.'15  Justice Rehnquist declined
to address what a "significant" or "insignificant" discrepancy might be or
who should make that determination.152 The Lee case at least presented a set
of facts that the Court determined represented significant discrepancies, but
the Court had yet to determine what facts represent insignificant
discrepancies in order for an accomplice confession to sufficiently
interlock. 153
Before Lee and Earnest, the Court had first addressed the issue of
interlocking confessions in Parker v. Randolph,154 where the Court focused
less on the reliability issue of the accomplice confession and more on the
"prejudicial impact" spared when the defendant's interlocking confession is
also admitted.'55 The Court's focus in Parker reflected the language from
150. See Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (discussing the admissibility of
interlocking confessions); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986) (discussing the admissibility of
interlocking confessions).
15 1. Justice Rehnquist, quoting from Lee, noted:
If those portions of the codefendant's purportedly "interlocking" statement which bear to
any significant degree on the defendant's participation in the crime are not thoroughly
substantiated by the defendant's own confession, the admission of the statement poses
too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict to be countenanced by the Sixth
Amendment. In other words, when the discrepancies between the statements are not
insignificant, the codefendant's confession may not be admitted.
See Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 545).
152. See id. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (failing to address the issue).
153. Lee, 476 U.S. at 545.
154. 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
155. Id. at 72-74. In Parker, the trial court admitted the codefendant's and defendant's hearsay
confessions, instructing the jury not to consider the codefendant's confession against the defendant.
Id. at 66-67. On appeal, then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, distinguished Parker from
Bruton, holding that "admission of interlocking confessions with proper limiting instructions
conforms to the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution." Id. at 75. Parker's holding addressed confusion among the lower courts, holding that
cases involving interlocking confessions were not controlled by the Bruton rule. See id. at 68 n.4.
The Parker Court reasoned that Bruton protected against the "devastating" consequences of
admitting a codefendant's confession in a joint trial with a non-confessing defendant. Id. at 72. It is
in situations such as Bruton, where the defendant "maintains his innocence," that the prejudicial
impact of a codefendant's confession "is simply too great in such cases to be cured by a limiting
instruction." Id. at 72. In contrast, where the defendant's own confession, which is merely
corroborated by the codefendant's interlocking confession, is introduced at trial, the Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examination of the codefendant is of "less practical value" and "likely [to]
yield small advantage" to the defendant "whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury
unchallenged." Id. at 73. While distinguishing the case from Bruton, the Court's analysis still
followed a type of reverse-Bruton rationale: If the prejudice caused to the defendant is minimal, then
the admission of the accomplice confession does not add weight to the government's case and does
not violate the Confrontation Clause. See id. (stating that Bruton protected against the admission of
codefendant confessions that added substantial weight to the government's case and prejudiced the
defendant); Keller, supra note 21, at 169.
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Douglas and Bruton where the Court was concerned about the harmfulness
of admitting an uncorroborated accomplice confession 156 and which may
speak more to the harmless error analysis and not the reliability inquiry on
which the Court's other Confrontation cases focused.1
57
In Cruz v. New York, 158 the Court's position swung the other way; it
rejected Parker and held that,
Quite obviously, what the "interlocking" nature of the
codefendant's confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but
rather its reliability: If it confirms essentially the same facts as the
defendant's own confession it is more likely to be true. Its
reliability, however, may be relevant to whether the confession
should (despite the lack of opportunity for cross-examination) be
admitted as evidence against the defendant .... "9
The Cruz Court further commented that "the defendant's confession
may be considered at trial in assessing whether his codefendant's statements
are supported by sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to be directly admissible
against him (assuming the 'unavailability' of the codefendant) despite the
lack of opportunity for cross-examination .. ." 160 Thus, the Cruz Court
allowed for the possibility that, where an accomplice confession is directly
admissible against the defendant (e.g. through the against penal interest
hearsay exception), interlock between the accomplice's and the defendant's
confessions could be used to satisfy the second "reliability prong" of the
Roberts Test.161 However, even after Bruton, Lee, and Cruz, the Court had
set forth no definitive rule on whether interlock between the accomplice's
and defendant's confessions could be used to infer reliability or if it was a
156. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415,416-23 (1965).
157. See Parker, 442 U.S. at 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the majority's opinion
"will result in no more than a shift in analysis" from whether the admission of an accomplice
confession is harmless when it is considered in light of the great weight provided by the defendant's
own confession). However, the Court briefly commented on reliability, noting that "the natural
'motivation to shift blame onto others,' recognized by the Bruton Court" did not "render the
incriminating statements of codefendants 'inevitably suspect' where the defendant's confession
"corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself." Id. at 73 (quoting
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136).
158. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
159. Id. at 192-93.
160. Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added). The Court's comment should be contrasted with its primary
holding with regard to joint trials: The Constitution bars the admission of a codefendant's confession
that is "not directly admissible against the defendant" under domestic hearsay law "even if the jury is
instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is
admitted against him." Id. at 193. The Court declined to explain why the Confrontation Clause may
not be violated if the codefendant's confession is directly admissible against the defendant under
domestic law. See id.
161. Id. at 193-94 (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543-44 (1986) and Bruton, 391 U.S. at
128).
factor in determining whether a Confrontation Clause violation was harmless
to the defendant.
1 62
2. Idaho v. Wright:163 Reliability and the Anti-Bootstrapping Rule
Later in Idaho v. Wright, 64 the Court honed its reliability analysis,
further clarifying what the prosecution must establish to satisfy the
"reliability prong" of the Roberts Test.165 The Wright Court stressed that, in
order to satisfy the Roberts Test, the out-of-court statement must be
inherently reliable. 66 The Court opined that the "[a]dmission [of hearsay]
under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional
requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding
judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain
types of out-of-court statements." 67 For those hearsay statements falling
outside a firmly rooted exception, particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness required for admissibility by Roberts "must be shown from
the totality of the circumstances," but only from those circumstances "that
surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant
particularly worthy of belief."1 68  The Court made clear that reliability
cannot be established by "evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay
statement," because this would "permit admission of a presumptively
unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other
evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay
evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that
cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility.' 69  As
162. See id.; Lee, 476 U.S. at 543-44; Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at
I (questioning on appeal whether an accomplice confession was admissible under the Clause on the
basis of the interlock theory).
163. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 816-17.
166. Id. at 816-19.
167. Id. at 817 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987); Lee, 476 U.S. at 552
(Blackmun, J. dissenting); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); and Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S.. 237, 243 (1895) to hold that Idaho's residual hearsay exception, which served as a "catch-
all" for statements not otherwise satisfying traditional hearsay exceptions, was not firmly rooted).
168. Id. at 819. The Court cited the firmly rooted "excited utterance" exception as an example of
hearsay statements made under such circumstances that "adversarial testing would add little to their
reliability." Id. at 820-21. Essentially, statements falling outside firmly rooted exceptions must be
as reliable as those falling under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 821.
169. Id. at 822-23. The Wright Court therefore rejected the State of Idaho's contention that
physical evidence corroborating a three-year old sexual abuse victim's accusations rendered her
hearsay statements adequately reliable for admission under the Confrontation Clause. Id. In doing
so, the Court considered Lee v. Illinois, where the Court similarly declined to rely upon
corroborative physical evidence and the "interlocking" confession theory to support the
trustworthiness of the accomplice's confession. Id. at 824. As in Lee, the Wright Court cautioned
against the use of "selective reliability": relying upon partial corroboration of the hearsay statement
to infer trustworthiness of the entire statement. Id. The Wright Court seemed to close the door,
whereas the Lee Court left open the possibility that an accomplice statement sufficiently interlocked
with a defendant's confession may satisfy the Confrontation Clause, as also recognized in Earnest.
See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649-50 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Lee, 476 U.S.
338
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cross-examination tests the declarant's state of mind and his truthfulness at
the time he made the statement, reliability will not be found in outside
factors and "other evidence" that merely corroborates the truth of the
statement.
70
Wright's prohibition against the use of "other evidence" to infer the
trustworthiness of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause necessarily called
into question the prosecution's use of a defendant's interlocking statement to
infer reliability of an accomplice's statement, a practice never flatly
prohibited in Lee. 7 ' Indeed, four of the dissenting justices in Wright cited
Lee and Cruz for the proposition that corroborating evidence, including the
use of a defendant's interlocking confession, should still be used to infer
trustworthiness,. 7 2 The Court had not yet directly addressed this issue of
at 545. The Wright Court noted, however, that corroborating evidence could be used for the
harmless-error analysis on the erroneous admission of hearsay. Wright, 497 U.S. at 823-24.
In contrast to the three-year old's statement in Wright, some courts have determined that
certain types of hearsay, which likewise do not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception,
nevertheless bear sufficient trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Anthony
v. Dewitt, 295 F.3d 554, 563-64 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a statement made by the defendant's
co-conspirator after the commission of the crime was not firmly rooted, but still satisfied the
reliability prong of the Roberts confrontation test). The Sixth Circuit in Anthony determined that the
circumstances surrounding the statement provided particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
because the co-conspirator "voluntarily made the statements to his wife in the privacy of their home
and they were against his penal interest." Id. Moreover the co-conspirator "viewed his wife as an
ally because he asked for her assistance in creating an alibi for him and concealing the crime." Id. at
564.
170. Wright, 497 U.S. at 826. When a hearsay statement is not admissible as "firmly rooted,"
courts must decide the "trustworthiness" issue on a case-by-case basis according to the particular
facts and circumstances that each case presents. See id.; White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Kennedy in his Wright dissent noted that "[g]iven the
principle [of the majority holding], for cases involving hearsay statements that do not come within
one of the traditional hearsay exceptions ... admissibility depends upon finding particular
guarantees of trustworthiness in each case [making it] difficult to state rules of general application."
See Wright, 497 U.S. at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The four Justices who dissented, including
Chief Justice Rehnquist, criticized the Wright majority's prohibition on the use of corroborating
evidence for the trustworthiness inquiry. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Predicting that this limitation
on corroborating evidence would "prove unworkable," the dissent stated, "[i]t is a matter of common
sense for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is
trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
Court's shifting and uncertain position on this issue is exemplified by Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, where he relied upon the majority holding of Wright
to reject the use of corroborating or "interlocking" confessions to establish reliability of an
accomplice confession. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1378 (2004) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring).
171. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 824; Lee, 476 U.S. at 545 (noting that "[o]bviously when
codefendants' confessions are identical in all material respects, the likelihood that they are accurate
is significantly increased").
172. Wright, 497 U.S. at 831-32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S.
186, 192-94 (1987) (stating that the interlocking nature of a codefendant's confession pertains to its
reliability); Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (suggesting that "indicia of
reliability" is satisfied if the accomplice confession sufficiently "interlocks" with the defendant's
confession); Lee, 476 U.S. at 545 (supporting the inference that when discrepancies between
otherwise interlocking confessions are insignificant, then the codefendant's statement may be
339
reliability and interlocking accomplice confessions, considering the
implications of both Wright and Lee.
1 73
B. The Court Wrestles with the Against Penal Interest Exception
There remained another significant issue surrounding the reliability and
admissibility of accomplice confessions that are admissible directly against a
defendant in those jurisdictions allowing the practice under an against penal
interest exception to the hearsay rule. 174 This exception was recognized at
common law and codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as many
state evidence codes. 75 However, the inherent suspicion in the reliability of
accomplice confessions, as increasingly recognized by the courts, 17 6 raised
the question of whether and under what circumstances accomplice
confessions could satisfy the Roberts Test. 1
77
1. Williamson v. United States:178 Dissecting the Hearsay Exception
Williamson v. United States179 presented a prime opportunity for the
Court to elucidate its position about admitting accomplice confessions under
the against penal interest hearsay exception, a necessary step to get most
accomplice confessions before the jury. 80 The defendant in Williamson
appealed the admission of his accomplice's confession under the statement
against penal interest exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 181 Justice
sufficiently reliable to be admitted). Even before the Court first addressed the issue in Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979), the concept that interlocking confessions were inherently reliable was
already part of federal jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cantanzaro v. Mancusi, 404
F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that "interlocking confessions" of jointly tried defendants were
reliable enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause).
173. Although the Court granted certiorari to address this issue in Crawford v. Washington, 539
U.S. 914 (2003), it never directly answered the questions raised by these cases, choosing instead in
Crawford to redefine the Confrontation Clause analysis completely and do away with the need to
establish reliability. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-73.
174. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120 (1999) (noting that the question on appeal to
the Supreme Court was the constitutional admissibility of a non-testifying accomplice's confession
that was directly admissible against the defendant under Virginia's against penal interest exception).
175. Aurzada, supra note 22, at 595; see also 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
318, at 340-41 (4th ed. 1992); see also FED. R. EVlD. 804(b)(3). As noted previously, Washington,
Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Texas, and West Virginia are among the
states that recognize the against penal interest exception. See supra note 42.
176. See, e.g., Lee, 476 U.S. at 544-45; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
177. See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120 (addressing, in several different opinions the constitutional
admissibility of non-testifying accomplice confessions).
178. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 596; see also Noworyta, supra note 48, at 440 (emphasizing that the confession must
be admissible under a domestic hearsay exception before the court determines whether admitting the
confession violates the Confrontation Clause under Roberts).
181. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598. The defendant was tried and convicted on drug distribution
charges. Id. at 597. At trial, a drug enforcement agent was allowed to testify as to an accomplice's
confession after the accomplice, Harris, refused to testify. Id. The trial court ruled that the
statements were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) because Harris' statement
"clearly implicated himself," and was therefore against his penal interest, and because Harris was
340
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O'Connor, who delivered the opinion for the plurality Court, struggled to
define the meaning of "statement" to determine whether and what portions
of the accomplice's long narrative confession were admissible under the
exception. 182
Similar to the concerns reflected in the Confrontation Clause, the Court
recognized that the general rule against hearsay was "premised on the theory
that out-of-court statements are subject to particular hazards," particularly
that the declarant could have lied, misperceived events, misremembered, and
that his statements could be taken out of context.18 3 Furthermore, "arrest
statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with special
suspicion," because of the codefendant's motivation to shift blame to the
defendant or curry favor with the authorities in order to exculpate himself.
1 84
Statements against the declarant's penal interest protected against these
risks, because people generally do not subject themselves to criminal
liability unless they believe the statements are true. 8 5 Nevertheless, the risk,
as the Court saw it, was that the accomplice would place false self-
exculpatory statements-those inculpating and shifting blame to the
defendant-in close proximity with more persuasive and true self-
inculpatory statements, because "[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is to
mix falsehood with truth."'' 86  For this reason, as Justice O'Connor
explained, the principle behind the Rule supported a narrow interpretation of
the against penal interest exception, allowing only those single "declarations
or remarks within the confession that are individually self-inculpatory.18 7
Accordingly, self-serving and collateral statements were not reliable enough
to satisfy the against penal interest exception.1 88 Justice O'Connor noted
that the Court's ruling did not preclude all accomplice statements that
unavailable as required by the rule. Id. at 598-99 (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) for the
admissibility of "statement[s] which.., at the time of [their] making... so far tended to subject the
declarant to ... criminal liability.., that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not
have made the statement[s] unless believing [them] to be true") (alterations in original).
182. See id. at 598-602. Justice O'Connor first looked at the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
defined "statement" as "'an oral or written assertion."' Id. at 599 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(1)).
She also noted that Webster's Dictionary defined "statement" as both "a report or narrative,"
suggesting an "extended declaration," and "a single declaration or remark." Id. (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Justice O'Connor ultimately concluded that the principle behind the
statement against penal interest rule, that people do not make self-inculpatory statements unless
believing them to be true, supported the narrower interpretation. Id.
183. Id. at 598.
184. Id. at 601 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986)). By now, the reliability
concerns surrounding accomplice confessions were well established. See, e.g., Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965).
185. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
186. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599-600.
187. Id. at 599.
188. Id. at 600-02.
inculpate a defendant, because when viewing each statement in context,
even seemingly neutral statements may actually be truly self-inculpatory. 89
Regarding the specific confession at issue in Williamson, the Court
remanded the case for further inquiry into the self-inculpatory nature of the
accomplice confession, never reaching the issue of whether the confession
was admissible under the Confrontation Clause.' 90 Williamson's emphasis
that reliability is found only in the portions of an accomplice confession that
are directly against penal interest is nevertheless significant for
Confrontation Clause analysis purposes, especially in light of the Court's
noting that "the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory.., is
itself one of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a
statement admissible under the Confrontation Clause."' 91
2. Lilly v. Virginia: 192 Creating an Uncertain State of Confrontation
Doctrine
After Williamson, questions remained about whether and under what
circumstances accomplice confessions admitted under an against penal
interest hearsay exception could satisfy the reliability requirement of the
Confrontation Clause. 93 Specifically, the Court had yet to determine
whether accomplice statements against penal interest could come in as a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception or would otherwise require particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness to meet the Roberts Test.194 The question does
not have particular relevance to those states that prohibit the admission of
third-party statements implicating the defendant in a criminal trial under
their against penal interest hearsay exceptions,' 95 nor to those states that do
not even have the against penal interest exception. 196  However, this
unanswered Confrontation Clause question applied to federal courts, because
as noted earlier, the language of the federal evidence rules allowed the
admission of accomplice statements against penal interest as evidence
against a defendant. 97 Likewise, several states that have adopted similar
rules and that have followed the interpretation of the against penal interest
189. Id. at 603. To use the Court's example, the statement, "I hid the gun in Joe's apartment," is
not necessarily a "confession of a crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the murder weapon,
then it is certainly self-inculpatory." Id. As one scholar noted, Justice Scalia also made the point in
his concurring opinion that "implicating someone else does not automatically negate the fact that the
statement is against the declarant's penal interest." Aurzada, supra note 22, at 601 (citing
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 606-07).
190. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.
191. Id. (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543-45 (1986)).
192. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
193. See id. at 134. Decided in 1999 after Williamson, the Supreme Court's plurality decision in
Lilly was the first to "explicitly" answer whether against penal interest accomplice confessions were
firmly rooted. Id.
194. See id. (deciding whether accomplice confessions were firmly rooted).
195. See id. at 133 n.4 (noting that Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Dakota, and Vermont are among such states by citing statutes and cases from those states).
196. See id. at 133-34 n.4 (citing hearsay laws in Alabama, Georgia, and Missouri).
197. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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exception from Williamson stood to benefit from the Court's guidance on the
issue of accomplice confessions.
198
Even after deciding in a number of cases whether specific hearsay
evidence violated a defendant's confrontation rights, case law in this area
remained incomplete and unsettled. 199 However, the Court did little to
resolve the open issues when it took up the matter of accomplice hearsay
confessions again in Lilly v. Virginia.200 While the Court did not come to a
consensus on the admissibility of accomplice confessions under the
Confrontation Clause, the Lilly decision highlighted the dialogue among the
Justices on the over-arching issues of how the Court should address the
intersection of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. 20 ' Lilly is thus more
important for the questions it raised-identifying key issues in confrontation
doctrine-rather than the questions it answered.20 2
Justice Stevens announced and delivered the plurality opinion of the
Court in Lilly, framing the question of the case as "whether the accused's
Sixth Amendment right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him'
was violated by admitting into evidence at his trial a nontestifying
accomplice's entire confession that contained some statements against the
accomplice's penal interest and others that inculpated the accused., 20 3  In
Lilly, the defendant was convicted of murder after the state introduced his
accomplice's tape-recorded confession under the against penal interest
exception for hearsay statements of an unavailable witness.2°4  The
defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of the accomplice confession
violated the Confrontation Clause.20 5  The Supreme Court of Virginia
198. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133 n.4 (providing a list of state court decisions which adhered to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as explained in Williamson);
State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 914 (2003), rev'd by 124 S. Ct.
1354 (2004). See also Kirst, supra note 1, at 92 ("[Clourts did not always have clear guidance from
the Supreme Court about whether [accomplice confessions were] forbidden by the Confrontation
Clause.").
199. Kirst, supra note 1, at 88.
200. See generally Lilly, 527 U.S. 116; see also Kirst, supra note 1, at 88 (noting that Lilly has
been "described as 'a case without a majority opinion' that has 'no majority analysis' because the
Court was 'fractured' or 'fragmented"') (citations omitted).
201. See Kirst, supra note 1, at 88-89.
202. Id. at 89.
203. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120. The defendant Lilly, his brother Mark, and a third acquaintance stole
liquor and guns from a home and robbed a small country store. Id. They later abducted the victim
during a carjacking and one of the men shot and killed the victim. Id. The three men proceeded to
rob two other stores before the police apprehended them. Id. Mark accused the defendant of
masterminding the robberies and maintained that he himself had been severely drunk during the
crime spree although he had participated in the robberies. Id. at 120-21. After the police told Mark
that if he did not "break family ties" he could face a life sentence, Mark admitted that his brother, the
defendant, had instigated the carjacking and shot the victim. Id. at 121. At the defendant's separate
trial for murder, the State of Virginia called Mark to testify, but Mark "invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
204. Id. at 121-22.
205. Id.
343
affirmed the conviction, holding that admission of the accomplice's
statements did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights, because they
were statements against interest and fell within a firmly rooted exception to
the state's hearsay law.2°6
All of the Justices concurred in reversing the Virginia Supreme Court
and a majority remanded the case for a review of whether the confrontation
violation was harmless error.2 °7 In analyzing the admissibility of the
accomplice confession under the Confrontation Clause, the opinions of the
Justices reflected the unique concerns surrounding the general reliability of
accomplice confessions that inculpate the defendant.2 °8
Justice Stevens' lead opinion analyzed the defendant's confrontation
challenge under the Roberts requirement that hearsay must either satisfy a
firmly rooted exception or carry particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 20 9  Before turning to the Roberts inquiry, Justice Stevens
rejected the argument advanced by Justice Thomas in White v. Illinois that
the Confrontation Clause should be "narrowly construed to apply only to"
the practice of prosecuting criminal defendants on certain formalized
testimonial materials, such as ex parte affidavits, out-of-court depositions,
and accomplice confessions. 10 Justice Stevens stated that the Court should
adhere to its Roberts framework, reasoning that "[b]ecause that restrictive
reading of the Clause's term 'witnesses' would have virtually eliminated the
Clause's role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony, we
considered it foreclosed by our prior cases.",21' The accomplice confession
at issue in Lilly, taken by the police for future use at trial, was formalized
testimonial material that would nevertheless implicate the Confrontation
Clause under this narrower approach.21 2
Joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Stevens turned to the
reliability inquiry under Roberts to analyze the against penal interest
exception to the hearsay rule.2 13 Justice Stevens commented that accomplice
206. Id. at 122 (noting that the Supreme Court of Virginia relied upon White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 356 (1992), for the proposition that proffered hearsay that comes within a firmly rooted
exception satisfies the Confrontation Clause).
207. Id. at 120, 135-40 (plurality opinion); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring in the Court's
judgment).
208. See generally id. at 120-49.
209. Id. at 124-25. Justice Stevens first determined, in Part II of his opinion, that the Supreme
Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 123. Even though the defendant had
focused on state hearsay law in his appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, he had also alleged a
Sixth Amendment violation and relied upon Supreme Court confrontation jurisprudence in his briefs
to the Court. Id. According to Justice Stevens, this was sufficient to challenge the constitutionality
of admitting Mark's statements, giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the case. Id.
210. Id. at 124 (citing Justice Thomas' concurrence in White, 502 U.S. at 361, 363, which argues
that the Clause should be thus interpreted).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 125.
213. Id. at 127. Citing Lee, Stevens noted that "the simple categorization of a statement as a
'declaration against penal interest.., defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause
analysis."' Id. (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986)). Accordingly, Justice Stevens
described three categories of statements commonly offered into evidence under the against penal
interest exception. Id.
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statements that incriminate a defendant are of "quite recent vintage" and,
when offered against a criminal defendant, are the functional equivalent of
those used in the early English ex parte affidavit system.21 4 Since the Court
first indicated its distrust of this type of evidence,215 the Court has "'spoken
with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices'
confessions that incriminate defendants. ' ' 21 6  Justice Stevens cited the
holdings from Douglas, Lee, White, and Williamson for the Court's
consistent reluctance to admit accomplice statements that "shift or spread
blame." 217 Reversing the Supreme Court of Virginia, Justice Stevens
declared that "accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant
are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept
has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 2 8
Justice Stevens cautioned that the Confrontation Clause does not impose
a "'blanket ban on the government's use of [nontestifying] accomplice
statements that incriminate a defendant.' Rather, it simply means that the
government must satisfy the second prong of Ohio v. Roberts .... ,,219 The
The first category involves voluntary admissions of the declarant that, when offered into
evidence against the declarant himself, are typically admissible without a confrontation problem. Id.
Justice Stevens described the common use of party opponent admission as having a "heritage
confirming their admissibility." Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(l) (stating that a party's own out-
of-court statements are admissible against him at trial). Justice Stevens further noted that, in joint
trials, admitting the declarant's confession against him, but not against his codefendant, involves
confrontation problems as elucidated in Bruton and its progeny. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127-29.
Moreover, in cases of jointly tried defendants, the fact that the codefendant's confession was against
his penal interest "did not justify its use as evidence against another person." Id. at 128.
The second category involves exculpatory evidence offered by the defendant who claims that it
was the declarant, and not he, "who committed (or was involved) in the crime in question." Id. at
129. The Confrontation Clause is not implicated in these situations because it is the defendant who
offers the evidence. Id. at 130.
The hearsay at issue in Lilly involved the third category: where the government offers the
statements of an alleged accomplice against the defendant. Id. It is really only this third category
that implicates the Confrontation Clause, because if a voluntary admission of the defendant were
offered against the defendant, he would not cross-examine himself and, further, if the defendant
offers exculpatory statements, there are no Confrontation Clause concerns. Leading Cases: L
Constitutional Law, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200, 239 (1999) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
214. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 130-31.
215. Id. at 131 (citing Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909) (holding that an
accomplice confession that "incriminate[s the accomplice] together with the defendant .... ought to
be received with suspicion, and with the very greatest care and caution ... ")).
216. Id. (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 541, and citing Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting) and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968)). While Justice
Stevens cited both Lee and Cruz, which involved interlocking confession issues, the Lilly opinion did
not address interlocking confession jurisprudence. See id. Justice Stevens was able to pass over this
issue because interlock was not at issue in Lilly. See id. Moreover, while the Court's precedent
supported the presumptive unreliability of accomplice confessions, the Court had never found an
accomplice confession constitutionally admissible based upon the interlock theory. See, e.g., Lee,
476 U.S. at 545; Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193.
217. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 132-34.
218. Id. at 134.
219. Id. at 135 n.5 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion).
Court's opinion thus centered on the unreliability of accomplice confessions
and not on their historical use in criminal trials. 20 However, Justice Stevens
noted that:
It is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that attaches
to accomplices' confessions that shift or spread blame can be
effectively rebutted when the statements are given under conditions
that implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit
practice-that is, when the government is involved in the
statements' production, and when the statements describe past
events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.22'
The case before the Court exemplified this observation.222 The
accomplice confession in Lilly lacked such particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness to make cross-examination at trial "superfluous" in order to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause.223 Specifically, the accomplice gave his
statement while under the influence of alcohol, under government custody
for serious charges, and in response to the police's leading questions, which
gave the accomplice a natural motive to exculpate himself as much as
possible. 224 Because the statements were "untrustworthy," the statements
violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.225
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice
O'Connor and Justice Kennedy joined.226 The Chief Justice found that the
accomplice statement in Lilly was not truly self-inculpatory and, therefore,
the facts of Lilly did not raise the question of whether genuinely self-
inculpatory accomplice confessions that inculpate the defendant violate the
Confrontation Clause.227 The Chief Justice believed that Justice Stevens'
plurality holding reached too broadly beyond the facts, amounting to a
"complete ban on the government's use of accomplice confessions that
inculpate a codefendant.' 228  While noting that custodial confessions are
220. See id. at 137-39.
221. Id. at 137.
222. See id. at 137-39. Justice Stevens rejected arguments that the statements were reliable
because 1) they were corroborated by other evidence (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822
(1990) (holding hearsay must be inherently trustworthy without reference to other trial evidence)); 2)
the police informed the accomplice of his Miranda rights before he made his statement (citing Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 (1986) (holding a confession that is voluntary under the Fifth
Amendment does not bear on the truthfulness of the confession)); and 3) the accomplice implicated
himself as a participant in the crime spree (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599
(1994) (holding that just because a person makes a broadly self-inculpatory statement does not mean
the non-self-inculpatory parts are more credible)). See id. at 137-39.
223. See id. at 138-39. This reasoning exemplifies the Court's position that reliability of
testimonial hearsay is an adequate substitute for the procedural guarantee of cross-examination, a
position that was explicitly rejected by the majority of the Court in Crawford v. Washington, which
Justice Stevens joined. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004).
224. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 139.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
227. Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
228. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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viewed with "special suspicion," the Chief Justice suggested that there was
no reason that "custodial confessions that equally inculpate both the
declarant and the defendant" should not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception; likewise non-custodial or "private" confessions, such as those
made to friends or family, may satisfy a firmly rooted exception. 229 The
Chief Justice concurred in the judgment because he decided only that a
custodial confession placing sole responsibility for the murder on the
defendant did not satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception.230
Justice Thomas wrote to espouse his view that the right of confrontation
is implicated by hearsay only when it is "contained in formalized testimonial
material, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 23'
This was an idea that Justice Thomas had also advanced in White v.
Illinois.23 2 While Justice Thomas found that the accomplice's statements, as
a custodial confession, fell within this category of "formalized testimony,"
he agreed with the Chief Justice's view that the Confrontation Clause did not
impose a blanket ban on accomplice confessions that incriminate a
defendant.233
In his own concurring opinion, Justice Scalia cited Justice Thomas'
view in White to support his belief that introduction of the accomplice
confession without opportunity for cross-examination amounted to a
"paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation. 234  As the confrontation
229. Id. at 146-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). The Chief Justice went on to cite
a number of federal court decisions that had "concluded that such statements fall under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception." See id. at 147 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
230. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 148.
231. Id. at 143 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)). Justice Thomas declined to analyze why or how the
accomplice's statements were "testimonial material" beyond the fact that they constituted a
"confession." Id. However, Justice Thomas' confrontation view, contained in both his White and
Lilly opinions, reflects the more traditional purpose of the Confrontation Clause. See California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970); Jonakait, supra note 74, at 578. Justice Thomas' view seems
consistent with those commentators who called for returning confrontation to its role as a
defendant's guarantee to an adversary process: testing in front of the jury of those "witnesses
against" the defendant, and prohibiting admission of their out-of-court "testimony." Jonakait, supra
note 74, at 585-86. Justice Thomas' traditionalist take on the Confrontation Clause departed from
the Court's "reliability-focused" approach, because the proper inquiry would not involve a reliability
analysis, but rather determining if the hearsay statement was "testimonial." Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143
(Thomas, J., concurring). Regardless of whether Justice Thomas' "testimonial" test met their
concerns, this departure was welcomed by commentators who argued that, while the adversary
system does tend to advance the accuracy of the truth-finding process, this does not necessarily lead
to the Court's conclusion that the prosecution's hearsay satisfies the Clause if it makes the truth-
finding process more accurate. See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 74, at 584-85. According to these
commentators, the accused should be guaranteed an adversary criminal trial, complete with cross-
examination of the defendant's accusers, even if that does not advance the best truth-determining
process. See id.
232. See White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring).
233. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143; Leading Cases, supra note 213, at 238.
234. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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violation was clear, Justice Scalia would have just remanded the case for a
determination of harmless error.235
Justice Breyer wrote to address a groundswell of scholarly arguments
that questioned the Court's confrontation doctrine as linking the
Confrontation Clause directly to the hearsay rule, turning the Clause into a
rule that protects "trustworthiness" and not "confrontation. 236  Justice
Breyer opined that the Roberts hearsay-based test is arguably "both too
narrow and too broad., 237  The test is too narrow in the sense that any
hearsay satisfying a firmly rooted hearsay exception receives little
Confrontation Clause scrutiny.238 On the other hand, the test is too broad
because it makes a constitutional issue out of any hearsay not falling within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception.239 Justice Breyer found that the Court did
not need to address this question in order to decide Lilly, but he wanted to
"point out that the fact that we do not reevaluate the link in this case does
not end the matter. It may leave the question open for another day. ' 24
Although none of the Justices' single opinions were supported by a
majority of the Court, Lilly did propose some confrontation rules that were
supported by a majority.24 1 "While none of these refinements derived from
Lilly are a holding on actual facts, each indicates how confrontation doctrine
might develop. '242 Seven Justices analyzed the admissibility of a custodial
confession under Roberts.243 Although there was no majority proposal on a
specific rule, "[aill nine Justices appeared to agree that the rule for a private
confession should not be the same as the rule for a custodial
confession ... ,, 2" However, the fractured Lilly opinion should not be
interpreted as simply drawing a distinction between custodial and non-
custodial confessions.245
As to custodial confessions, the Court left open the possibility that an
accomplice confession may have particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness, but "provided a limited survey of which facts might suffice
as particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. '246 Moreover, the Court's
acknowledgment that custodial confessions are highly suspect indicated that
235. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); Leading Cases, supra note 213, at 238.
236. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 141 (Breyer, J., concurring).
238. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 142 (Breyer, J., concurring); Leading Cases, supra note 213, at 238.
240. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142-43. Just five years after Lilly, the Court abolished the Roberts Test in a
purported effort to sever the link between hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1356-73 (2004).
241. Kirst, supra note 1, at 94-95.
242. Id. at 95.
243. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134-35 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.); Lilly, 527
U.S. at 148 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and joined by O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.).
244. Kirst, supra note 1, at 95. One commentator surveyed ninety-eight appellate cases decided
after Lilly which involved the use of a private confession and eighteen of these convictions were
upheld in favor of admissibility. See id. at 105, 138 n.407.
245. Leading Cases, supra note 213, at 240.
246. Kirst, supra note 1, at 96.
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they might never be trustworthy enough.247  The Court further declined to
list any factors for lower courts to consider when determining whether
hearsay has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.248
On the other hand, the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy believed that genuinely self-inculpatory custodial confessions may
satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception without the need to address
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under Roberts. 249 On its facts,
however, Lilly did not provide a basis for testing the Justices' stances on
whether the equally or genuinely inculpatory nature of an accomplice's
custodial confession could provide sufficient "indicia of reliability" where
the self-accusations in the confession are closely tied to statements relating
to the defendant's guilt.
25 0
247. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137 (noting that "[i]t is highly unlikely that the presumptive
unreliability that attaches to accomplice's [custodial] confessions that shift or spread blame can be
effectively rebutted"). Many of the cases following Lilly involved the use of accomplice custodial
confessions. Kirst, supra note 1, at 107. In forty-five cases involving custodial confessions out of
ninety-eight post-Lilly cases surveyed, the accomplice confession was inadmissible under Lilly,
because the statement in some way shifted or spread blame, curried favor with authorities, or
avoided suspicion. Id. at 106. In twenty-five of the ninety-eight cases, appellate courts held that
Lilly did not exclude the use of a custodial confession. Id. at 112. The lower courts departed from
Lilly by 1) reasoning that Lilly was a plurality opinion and thus not binding precedent; 2) narrowly
interpreting Lilly to avoid its conclusions about trustworthiness; 3) holding that Lilly did not apply to
an accomplice statement that did not name or refer to the defendant when it was made or after it was
redacted; or 4) admitting genuinely self-inculpatory confessions. Id. at 113.
248. Kirst, supra note 1, at 144. The Court's reasons for finding a lack of trustworthiness were
fairly fact-specific to the Lilly case, for instance, Lilly's intoxication, leading questions by the police,
and shifting and spreading blame for the worst part of the crime spree to the defendant. Lilly, 527
U.S. at 139. While some of the ninety-eight post-Lilly cases surveyed used these Lilly facts as
factors against trustworthiness, none of these cases identified "additional facts that might be used to
generate even a tentative list of guarantees of trustworthiness." Kirst, supra note 1, at 145.
249. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146. Justices Thomas and Scalia's position on the genuinely self-
inculpatory issue is less clear. Leading Cases, supra note 213, at 241. While both believe that the
Confrontation Clause is only "'implicated by... formalized testimonial material, such as...
confessions,"' the phrase "implicated by" is not equated with "violated by." Id. at 240 (quoting
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)). Taking into account the fact that both Justices Scalia and Thomas focused on the truly
self-inculpatory nature of the accomplice confession in Williamson, arguably both Justices view a
Confrontation Clause violation as one that "hinges on whether the statement is genuinely self-
inculpatory." Id. at 240-41.
250. Kirst, supra note 1, at 97-98. The facts of Lilly involved a statement that shifted
responsibility for the murder to the defendant, depriving the Court of an opportunity to discuss under
what circumstances truly self- inculpatory confessions might be admissible. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121,
146 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). In fact, four of the ninety-eight post-Lilly appellate
cases that were surveyed upheld the constitutional admissibility of genuinely self-inculpatory
custodial confessions that also implicated the defendant for reasons such as the fact that the
accusations against the defendant were intertwined closely with the self-inculpating portions and that
the accomplice did not appear to be shifting blame to the defendant. Kirst, supra note 1, at 130-34
(citing United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2001); People v.
Farrell, 34 P.3d 401 (Colo. 2001); Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305 (Colo. 2001); Gabow v.
Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63 (Ky. 2001)).
The Lilly Court arguably allowed for the possibility of alternative
trustworthiness grounds for admitting accomplice statements against a
defendant.25' Chief Justice Rehnquist had not specifically rejected the use of
interlocking confessions to establish reliability, a position he had earlier
supported in New Mexico v. Earnest.252 The Chief Justice's positions in
Earnest and Lilly suggest that the interlocking theory and the
genuinely/equally inculpatory theory could provide alternative grounds for
an accomplice confession to satisfy the Roberts reliability requirement.
253
Thus, after Lilly the Court had yet to resolve many issues surrounding
accomplice confessions, and the Justices' varying views on the matter
251. At least ten cases following Lilly that involved accomplice statements against interest were
admitted under other Supreme Court precedent, serving as a reminder that a prosecutor can use an
accomplice statement under another confrontation rule despite the fact that it would be excluded
under Lilly. Kirst, supra note 1, at 104-05 & n. 113 (citing United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d
Cir. 2001); Martin v. State, 57 S.W.3d 136 (Ark. 2001); People v. Davis, 2001 WL 1589245 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2001); State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa 2000); State v. Hallum, 606
N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 2000); Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 723 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 2000); People v. Riley,
636 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. 2001); State v. Moreno, 2000 WL 16318 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2000);
State v. Dennis, 523 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1999); State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977 (Wash. 2000)).
252. 477 U.S. 648 (1986). For example, as one scholar has pointed out, Justice Rehnquist in New
Mexico v. Earnest stated that an accomplice's confession could be admissible against a defendant if
it was "'thoroughly substantiated by the defendant's own confession"' because the facts of the
confession interlocked. See Kirst, supra note 1, at 97 (citing Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986))..
253. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring); Kirst, supra note 1, at 97-98 (noting that the Chief Justice's position indicates that
"theories about confrontation should be considered tentative and open to reconsideration if they are
not part of a holding"); see also State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663-64 (Wash. 2002) (holding that
interlocking confessions are an alternative ground for satisfying the "indicia of reliability" test), cert.
granted, 539 U.S. 914 (2003), rev'd by 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). However, Justice Stevens' opinion
in Lilly indicates that at least four of the Justices would reject the use of corroborating evidence to
infer reliability. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137-38 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990), to
say that the Court has "squarely rejected the notion that evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay
statement may properly support a finding that the statement bears particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness") (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, some of the opinions following
Lilly upheld the admission of custodial accomplice confessions, relying partly on corroboration by
other evidence at trial as a guarantee of trustworthiness. Kirst, supra note 1, at 145.
The Court's focus on the inherent reliability found in the making of custodial confessions also
indicates another potential result: When an accomplice's confession interlocks with a defendant's so
that it is admissible under the interlock theory, the confession may still be thrown out on the
alternative ground that the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement are unreliable.
See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137-139 (stating that the accomplice confession did not carry sufficient
"indicia of reliability" because of the circumstances surrounding the custodial confession); Wright,
497 U.S. at 826 (rejecting the use of corroborating physical evidence to infer reliability, which can
be found only in the circumstances of the statement's making); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541,
545 (1986) (stating that the codefendant's custodial confession was unreliable because of his motive
to spread blame and because defendant's confession did not sufficiently interlock). Whether or not
an accomplice confession that is genuinely self-inculpatory could likewise still be inadmissible
because of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement is unclear after Lilly. Kirst,
supra note 1, at 97-98. However, an equally inculpatory confession, by its own nature, is unlikely to
spread or shift blame-a primary reliability concern long held by the Court. See, e.g., Lilly, 527
U.S. at 136; Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 601 (1994); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
357 (1992); Lee, 476 U.S. at 545.
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created an uncertain state of confrontation doctrine as demonstrated by the
lower courts' inconsistent interpretations of the Court's precedent. 54
IV. AN OVERVIEW: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PRECEDENT AND ITS
CRITICISMS
Reliability has been a fundamental focus of the Court's confrontation
jurisprudence beginning with Mattox, which recognized that confrontation
ensured that the declarant and his statements were subject to adversarial
testing. It also made clear that the defendant's right of confrontation must
give way to public policy, such as necessity of the evidence, in those
situations when adversarial testing of the hearsay evidence is not as
valuable. 6  Douglas, however, found that the prosecution's use of
accomplices' custodial confessions that implicate the defendant in an equal
or more serious crime pose more serious problems under the Confrontation
Clause, especially when the inculpatory confession is crucial evidence for
the government's case. 57 The Bruton Court further strengthened the Court's
view toward the inherent unreliability of inculpatory accomplice confessions
and the harmfulness of admitting a codefendant's confession in a joint trial
where the confession is key evidence against the defendant who has no
opportunity to cross-examine his codefendant. 8
Roberts, together with White, established the Court's Confrontation
Clause framework, which could be used to analyze the admissibility of
accomplice confessions: hearsay was admissible under the Confrontation
Clause if it satisfied a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or if the declarant
was unavailable and the hearsay carried particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.25 9 Even with a universal framework in place, the Court
struggled to define a consistent doctrine, which was exemplified by two
issues surrounding accomplice confessions.260
Lee grappled with the issue of interlocking confessions, wherein the
Court found that the particular circumstances surrounding the accomplice
confession at issue, coupled with the fact that the defendant's and
254. See Kirst, supra note 1, at 104-44 (discussing the inconsistent application of the Court's
confrontation doctrine following Lilly as lower courts interpreted Lilly in "many ways").
255. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (stating that confrontation protects the
defendant's right to test the declarant's recollection, sift his conscience, and allow the jury to decide
whether the declarant is "worthy of belief').
256. Id. at 243 (finding that the former testimony of a declarant who was cross-examined at a
previous trial, along with dying declarations, were admissible where the declarant was unavailable).
257. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,419-20 (1965).
258. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28, 137 (1968).
259. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992).
260. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120-47 (1999) (struggling with the admissibility of an
accomplice confession under the against penal interest exception); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541,
539-45 (1986) (dealing with interlocking confessions).
accomplice's confessions were not sufficiently interlocking, did not provide
sufficient reliability to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 161 While the Court
provided for the possibility of using interlock for Confrontation Clause
purposes, it did not clarify whether interlock may be used to infer reliability
or as a factor in the harmless error analysis.
262
Wright seemed to close the door that Lee left open, holding that
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness could only be found in the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and
not by reference to other corroborating evidence, thus casting doubt on
whether the interlock theory could be used to infer reliability of an
accomplice confession. 263 Because the Court had never directly addressed it,
the permissible use of interlock to establish the reliability of an accomplice
confession remained an open issue.2"
The second issue surrounding accomplice confessions, the against penal
interest exception, arose in Williamson where the Court required intense
scrutiny of an accomplice confession to insure that each statement within it
was directly against the declarant's interest in order to be reliable, and in
fact, to be one of the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required by
the Confrontation Clause.2 65  The Lilly opinion could only muster four
Justices to hold that accomplice confessions admitted under the against
penal interest exception were not firmly rooted, doubting whether these
presumptively unreliable statements could ever carry particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.266
Moreover, a majority of the Justices could not agree on a workable standard
for analyzing accomplice confessions under the Roberts confrontation
framework, and a few of the Justices questioned the framework altogether.267
If anything, Lilly is an example of the Court's somewhat convoluted
interpretation and divided application of its confrontation doctrine.268
Indeed, the Lilly plurality's treatment of the against penal interest exception
serves to highlight the shortcomings of the Roberts doctrine as some justices
argued that certain accomplice confessions should be admissible under a
firmly rooted exception without further constitutional analysis while some
justices would engage in an intensive 'trustworthiness' inquiry on a case-by-
261. Lee, 476 U.S. at 539, 545.
262. Id. at 545-46; see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990); Cruz v. New York, 481
U.S. 186, 192-93 (1987).
263. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 822-23; see also Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
1378 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that Wright would have precluded the lower
court's reliance on the interlocking nature of the defendant's and accomplice's confession to
establish reliability).
264. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (questioning whether the interlock theory provided
sufficient reliability for Confrontation Clause purposes).
265. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994).
266. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999).
267. See id. at 120-47.
268. See id.
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case basis. 269 The Lilly plurality epitomized the culmination of the frequent
division among the Court regarding the admissibility of accomplice
confessions and the evaluation of confrontation doctrine on a broader
level.27 °
The fractured views of the Court spurred the arguments of
commentators and contemporary justices who have criticized the Court for
tying the right of confrontation too closely to the hearsay rule, including an
array of so-called "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions that serve as the
driving force behind Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 271 Advocates of a
new framework argued that the Court should focus on a more literal
interpretation of the Clause-confrontation of the defendant's accusers, as
opposed to reliability.27 2 Critics of the Court's reliability focus could point
to the Court's failure to find a truly unified voice on the issue of accomplice
confessions under the Clause as a prime example of the need for a new
approach.273 Among the major suggested approaches arose a central theme:
269. Compare id. at 134 (announcing the opinion of the Court) with id. at 146-47 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). See also Leading Cases, supra note 213, at 242. The inadequacies of the Roberts
framework, as accentuated by Lilly, are illustrated by the following dilemma: The against penal
interest exception is not the only way to admit an accomplice statement against a defendant that
incriminates that defendant. Id. at 242-43. An accomplice statement is often admissible under the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). In Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the Court held the co-conspirator exception to be firmly
rooted. Id. at 183. Thus, accomplice confessions, including those that place sole responsibility on
the defendant, and which might otherwise violate the Confrontation Clause under Lilly, may still
satisfy the co-conspirator exception and arguably not offend the Confrontation Clause. Leading
Cases, supra note 213, at 242-43. Therefore, whether the defendant's confrontation rights are
violated would depend upon the manner in which the prosecution labeled the confession. Id. at 243.
Because the Lilly Court did not address this dilemma directly, it set Lilly on a "collision course with
Roberts and Bourjaily," so that if the Court ever addressed this conflict, it would be prompted to
reevaluate its hearsay-based confrontation jurisprudence, which Justice Breyer anticipated in his
Lilly concurrence. Id. at 243-44 & n.81.
270. See, e.g., Williamson, 512 U.S. 594 (plurality with four separate opinions); White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346 (1992) (7-2 decision); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (5-4 decision); Cruz v.
New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987) (5-4 decision); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (5-4 decision);
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (6-2 decision).
271. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Lilly, 527 U.S. at 141 (Breyer, J., concurring); White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 25-26; Leading Cases, supra note 213, at 242;
Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: The Current State of a
Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REv. 763, 800-01 (2000).
272. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 141 (Breyer, J., concurring); Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 28-37;
Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1045, 1045-47 (1998); Dickinson, supra note 271; Douglass, supra note 74, at 195; Jonakait,
supra note 74, at 578-79.
273. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116 (plurality opinion supported by four concurring opinions); Lee, 476
U.S. at 547 (four dissenting justices); Dickinson, supra note 271, at 763. For instance, one critique
was that the Court had failed to make clear distinctions between general out-of-court statements and
government-prepared hearsay. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J.
641, 698 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles]; see also supra note 244 and
accompanying text (noting that, although there was no majority proposal on a specific rule, the
Justices seemed to agree that the rule for private confessions should not be the same for custodial
353
that of severing the Clause from its marriage to hearsay and reliability and
returning the Clause to its traditional roots.274 These approaches purportedly
narrowed and simplified the Clause's application, stepping away from the
Roberts framework that had produced inconsistent results, set forth ad hoc
rules simply to achieve fair results, and clung to the concept that the hearsay
rule was somehow related to the Confrontation Clause.
2 75
One of the major suggested changes to the Court's approach came from
two of its own members. Justices Thomas and Scalia advocated that the
Sixth Amendment's original purpose did not apply the confrontation right
generally to all hearsay, but only extended the confrontation right to those
out-of-court statements that are "contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.' 276
Other suggested approaches reflected similar traditionalist theories,
including a bar on admitting all hearsay statements gathered by the
government unless the declarant is produced for trial,277 or a prohibition on
those statements made with the understanding that they will be used at
trial.278
confessions). But see White, 502 U.S. at 358-66 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Justice Scalia)
(seeming to draw a distinction with certain types of government-produced "testimonial materials").
274. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 271, at 803-08; Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles,
supra note 273, at 694-97; see also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 28-37.
275. Dickinson, supra note 271, at 801-10, 818 (criticizing the current approach for allowing
government produced statements, such as custodial accomplice confessions, to be admitted against a
defendant without cross-examination merely because the statement fortuitously falls in a firmly
rooted hearsay exception); Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note 273, at 647 (arguing
that a return to the plain meaning of the Sixth Amendment would simplify many of the problems the
Court has created with its current confrontation framework).
276. White, 502 U.S. at 360-65 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Justice Scalia) (noting that this
approach would be consistent with the vast majority of the Court's previous Confrontation Clause
opinions and would simplify confrontation issues with hearsay). But see generally Crawford v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (announcing this standard without adopting a test for how to
determine if hearsay is "testimonial").
277. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal
For a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 561-64 (1992) (noting that under this
"prosecutorial restraint" approach, hearsay statements not gathered by the government would still be
analyzed under the Confrontation Clause, but not at such a heightened standard); Dickinson, supra
note 271, at 804-05.
278. Dickinson, supra note 271, at 804-06; see also Oral Argument, Crawford v. Washington, 123
S. Ct. 2275 (2003) (No. 02-94 10), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argument-transcripts/02-9410.pdf (Petitioner argued that a person makes a testimonial statement
when he understands the statement will be used in a criminal investigation). Suggested approaches
also included the following:
An "infringement of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause occurs when as a result of the accused being
denied the opportunity to cross-examine, a reasonable probability exists that the judge or jury
misweighed the evidence to the accused's detriment." Jonakait, supra note 74, at 589-611 (stating
that examples of admissible forms of hearsay under this standard are former testimony, business
records, and super reliable statements). This is much like the Strickland v. Washington standard for
the denial of right to counsel, another Sixth Amendment right. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (stating that there must be a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"). The reasoning is
that cross-examination's central role is to "test and challenge the evidence in front of the jury so that
the jury will have all the information necessary to best assess what weight the evidence should be
given." Jonakait, supra note 74, at 587-88. If cross-examination would not have led the jury to
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However, the Court adhered to nearly twenty-five years of reliability-
based Confrontation Clause precedent beginning with its 1980 decision in
Roberts when the Court first solidified its confrontation framework.' 9 It is
significant that as recently as 1999, seven of the nine justices analyzed the
Confrontation Clause issue under the Roberts Test.2 80  Moreover, Lilly was
not the first case in which the Roberts hearsay-confrontation framework had
been criticized, and yet the Court continued to reaffirm its precedent and the
reliability principles of confrontation questions. 8' In fact, members of the
Court rebuffed attempts, even by their fellow jurists, to fashion a new
standard.
28 2
weigh the evidence more favorably for the accused, then the defendant has suffered no detriment
from the lack of cross-examination. Id. at 588.
While this standard purports to depart from the Court's reliability-hearsay focus, it circles right
back to the issue. Id. at 596. When a jury assesses what weight to give the evidence, it is essentially
determining how reliable the evidence is. See Jonakait, supra note 74, at 608 (noting that a hearsay
statement would be admissible under this suggested standard if it is "so trustworthy that it must be
accurate"). The standard is arguably nothing more than a variation on the Court's recognition that
statements are constitutionally "reliable" where cross-examination of the declarant would be
superfluous. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990).
The Court was also critiqued for turning the Confrontation Clause into a rule governing the
admissibility of evidence rather than a right of confronting evidence and cross-examining witnesses
at trial. See Douglass, supra note 74, at 195. The concern was that the confrontation fight ends at
exactly the point where it should begin: once hearsay passes constitutional muster and is admitted
into evidence. Id. at 194. Therefore, a suggested approach was to provide for an "affirmative right
to 'confront' hearsay, to impeach the hearsay declarant, and to challenge hearsay testimony through
any reasonably available means." Id. at 197, 252-53.
Other commentators have suggested approaches similar to the one advocated by Justice
Thomas in White and Lilly, arguing that the Confrontation Clause should be more narrowly and
strictly construed to flatly prohibit statements of those who are "witnesses" against the defendant.
Amar, supra note 272, at 1045-46. However, the word "witnesses" has so many possible
interpretations that it renders any new standard attempting to narrow the Clause's scope with this
term equally, if not more, amorphous than the Roberts Test. See id. at 1046 (discussing the multiple
meanings and understandings of the word "witnesses"). For example, it has been suggested that
"witnesses" encompasses only those who "testify either by taking the stand in person or via
government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like." Id. at 1045. Another
interpretation is that "witnesses" includes those who give statements elicited by government agents
acting under auspices of a criminal prosecution. Dickinson, supra note 271, at 807-08. Proponents
recognize that a new standard does not necessarily provide an easier and cleaner application,
especially when it comes to accomplice confessions. See Amar, supra note 272, at 1049 (noting that
"[p]olice station confessions and statements are a tad trickier"). An accomplice's confession at the
police station is almost always elicited by government agents during a criminal prosecution, but are
the statements necessarily "government-prepared testimony" when they are given without an oath?
See Amar, supra note 272, at 1049; Dickinson, supra note 271, at 807.
279. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980); see, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 346; Wright, 497 U.S.
at 805; Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
280. See Kirst, supra note 1, at 95 n.50 for a breakdown.
281. See White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's confrontation
framework should be replaced in favor of the traditional "formalized testimonial" approach). While
Justice Thomas continued to advance this view in Lilly, a majority of the Justices adhered to the
Roberts framework. Kirst, supra note 1, at 95 & n.50.
282. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124 (rejecting Justice Thomas' proposal from White, and urging that
the Court adhere to its Roberts framework, because a "restrictive reading of the Clause's term
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The unsettled state of confrontation jurisprudence left it ripe for further
adjudication by the Court.283 Notwithstanding a reevaluation of the Roberts
reliability framework, confusion among the Court's confrontation precedent
necessitated clarification on 1) whether interlock is a proper basis for
reliability of an accomplice confession,284 or 2) whether interlock is only an
appropriate basis for harmless error analysis, 285 and 3) whether and when
accomplice confessions that are admitted directly against a defendant are
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.286
V. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: CONFRONTING THE ISSUES WITH A NEW
RULE
The Court's next opportunity to address accomplice confessions and the
Confrontation Clause came in Crawford v. Washington, which focused on
the interlocking confessions doctrine and a reevaluation of the Roberts
framework.287 Crawford involved an appeal from the Washington Supreme
Court, where the defendant was charged with first degree assault with a
deadly weapon after stabbing Richard Lee at Lee's apartment.288 On the
night of the offense, police arrested the defendant and his wife Sylvia, who
had been present during the assault.2 89 In tape recorded statements, the
defendant and Sylvia told their stories: on the night of the assault, the
defendant became angry over an incident that occurred several weeks prior,
in which Lee had allegedly sexually assaulted Sylvia.29 ° Sylvia then directed
the defendant to Lee's apartment where, after talking with Lee for a while,
the defendant stabbed Lee twice. 29' The key distinguishing factor in these
statements was that the defendant insinuated that Lee may have had
something in his hand as the defendant stabbed him, but Sylvia indicated
that Lee may have reached for something after he was stabbed.292
At trial, the defendant claimed self-defense and invoked Washington's
marital privilege to prevent Sylvia from testifying against him.293 The state
introduced Sylvia's tape-recorded confession under the state's against penal
'witnesses' would have virtually eliminated the Clause's role in restricting the admission of hearsay
testimony"); White, 502 U.S. at 352-53 (brushing aside Justices Thomas and Scalia's approach as
coming "too late in the day").
283. See Crawford v. Washington, 539 U.S. 914 (2003) (granting certiorari in a Confrontation
Clause case).
284. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-26.
285. See id.; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545-46 (1986) (focusing on the harmfulness of
admitting the accomplice confession that did not sufficiently interlock).
286. See generally Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120-48.
287. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1357-59 (2004); Petitioner's Brief, supra note
14, at 1.
288. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 914 (2003), rev'd
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interest exception to the hearsay rule. Subsequently, the jury disbelieved the
self-defense claim and convicted the defendant of first-degree assault with a
deadly weapon.294  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that the defendant's confrontation right was violated by
admission of Sylvia's confession.295
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
and reinstated the conviction, finding that Sylvia's confession was
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause because it
interlocked with the defendant's own confession.296
The Supreme Court accepted Crawford's appeal of the Washington
Supreme Court's ruling.297 The questions on appeal were: 1) whether the
Confrontation Clause "permits the admission against a criminal defendant of
a custodial statement by a potential accomplice on the ground that parts of
the statement 'interlock' with the defendant's custodial statement," and 2)
whether the "Court should reevaluate the Confrontation Clause framework
established in Ohio v. Roberts" in favor of a framework that prohibits
admission of hearsay contained in formalized testimonial material, such as
custodial confessions. 298 In a landmark 7-2 decision, the Court bypassed the
first issue and reversed decades of its own precedent to announce a new
Confrontation Clause rule.299
294. Id. At closing argument the prosecutor relied upon Sylvia's statement, arguing that her
statement that Lee reached for something after he was stabbed refuted the defendant's self-defense
claim. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 12.
295. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 658. The appeals court found that admission of Sylvia's statement
"was reversible error because her statement did not possess adequate indicia of reliability, nor did it
interlock with Michael's second statement." Id.
296. Id. at 664. The court first determined that invoking the privilege rendered Sylvia unavailable
for Confrontation Clause purposes. Id. at 659. Adhering to the Williamson rule, the court next
determined that Sylvia's entire confession describing the defendant's involvement in the stabbing
was self-inculpatory, rendering it admissible under the "against interest exception." Id. at 662-63.
The court reasoned that, while Sylvia's statements were damaging to the defendant, Sylvia also
implicated herself as an accomplice. Id. at 662. Thus, Sylvia would benefit from limiting the
defendant's liability, but instead she increased the defendant's culpability by saying that Lee had
empty hands when he was stabbed, consequently increasing her own culpability as well. Id. at 662-
63.
Turning to the Confrontation Clause analysis, the court relied upon the state's interlocking
confession rule that states, "[wihen a codefendant's confession is virtually identical [i.e., interlocks]
to that of a defendant, it may be deemed reliable." Id. at 663 (citing State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416
(Wash. 1993) as adopting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986)). The, court specifically found that
both Sylvia's statement and the defendant's confessions were sufficiently interlocking in that they
were "equally ambiguous" and "unclear" on "when, if ever, Lee possessed a weapon." Id. at 664.
297. Crawford v. Washington, 539 U.S. 914 (2003).
298. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 1.
299. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1354-70 (2004). Considering that many of the
Court's past confrontation cases resulted in 5-4 or plurality decisions, the apparent solidarity, at least
among seven of the Justices, is remarkable, especially considering that the Court took such a radical
step in overhauling its confrontation precedent. See supra notes 266-270 and accompanying text.
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Justice Scalia, who had only concurred in the judgments in both White
and Lilly,3°° now delivered the Court's majority opinion.30 1  Justices
Ginsburg, Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice
Scalia. °2
The Court began by noting that the text of the Sixth Amendment does
not alone "resolve" whether the Roberts reliability framework comports with
the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, making it immediately apparent
that the Court would reconsider altogether its Roberts framework in the
ensuing opinion.30 3 The Court then launched into a historical analysis of the
common law confrontation right by examining sources discussing English
common law cases, which the Court believed that the Constitution's Framers
relied upon in drafting the Confrontation Clause.3°4 Upon examination of
the historical common law confrontation right, the Court reached two
conclusions: 1) the Confrontation Clause was directed at prohibiting the "use
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused, '30 5 and 2) the
Framers of the Constitution "would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. 3 °6
300. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring); White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
301. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1356.
302. Id.
303. See id. at 1359. Instead of delving into the traditional Roberts analysis with which Justice
Stevens began his Lilly opinion only five years previous, Justice Scalia first addressed Petitioner
Crawford's contention that Roberts should be overruled. Compare Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124-25 with
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
304. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (citations omitted).
305. Id. at 1363. The out-of-court statements that concerned the common law courts of England
were pre-trial examinations of the defendant's accusers by Justices of the Peace, which were often
read at trial in lieu of live testimony. Id. at 1359. This was "a practice that 'occasioned frequent
demands by the prisoner to have ... the witnesses against him, brought before him face to face."'
Id. (quoting 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883)). Justice
Scalia noted that some common law cases still allowed evidence of out-of-court statements without
cross-examination at trial. Id. at 1361 (citation omitted). However, around the time the Constitution
was ratified in 1791, courts were applying the original common law rule that out-of-court statements
were inadmissible without the "'benefit of a cross-examination." Id. (citing three King's Bench
cases from 1791, 1789, and 1787, and two nineteenth century treatises as evidence of the Framer's
intent to adopt this rule). Justice Scalia also cited to early state courts as support for the original
meaning of the common law confrontation right, noting that some courts did not allow out-of-court
examinations unless the defendant had been present to cross-examine the accuser, while other early
cases "went so far as to hold that prior testimony was inadmissible in criminal cases even if the
accused had a previous opportunity to cross-examine." Id. (citing to several early cases in support).
306. Id. at 1365. Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation that the Confrontation Clause applies only
to testimonial materials was rejected by Justice Stevens in his opinion for the Court in Lilly as too
narrow. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124 (citing Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 361, 363 (1992)).
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A. The Confrontation Clause Applies to "Testimonial" Statements
The first conclusion led to a determination of the type of statements that
implicate the Confrontation Clause.30 7 The Court determined that the Clause
only applies to "'witnesses' against the accused," which it interpreted to
mean those who give "testimonial" statements. 30 8 However, the Court
declined to adopt a standard to determine when a statement is "testimonial,"
"leav[ing] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition
of 'testimonial. ' ' 309  The Court's only guidance was several "various
formulations" of the term "testimonial" statements, determining that "at a
minimum... prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial," as well as statements made during police interrogations,
are "testimonial., 3 0  Respecting police interrogations, the Court suggested
that this category of testimonial statements includes any circumstances
where government officers are "involve[d]" in producing statements "with
an eye toward trial," as the Court believed was the case in Crawford.)"
The Court reasoned that even under a "narrow standard," "[s]tatements
taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial,"
because police interrogations are analogous to the pre-trial examinations by
eighteenth-century justices of the peace, which gave rise to the common law
confrontation right.312 The Court failed to further describe how police
307. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363-64.
308. Id. at 1364.
309. Id. at 1374.
310. Id. at 1364, 1374. The Court cited several proposed tests to determine when a statement is
"testimonial," including "'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially."' Id. at 1364 (quoting Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 23). The Court listed
these varying standards, but concluded that the Clause excluded Sylvia Crawford's confession
"[r]egardless of the precise articulation" of the "testimonial" statements standard. See id. at 1364,
1374.
311. Id. at 1367 n.7 (declining to explain what "involve[d]" or "with an eye toward trial" means).
312. Id. at 1364-65. The Court contended that the justices of the peace during the era of the
Constitution's founding had more of an investigative and prosecutorial function rather than a judicial
function, which makes their examinations comparable to current-day law enforcement
interrogations. Id. at 1365. The Court refuted Chief Justice Rehnquist's claim that the traditional
confrontation right did not extend to unswom statements, such as confessions to law enforcement, by
arguing that it is "implausible" that the Sixth Amendment would bar swom testimony but would
admit unswom testimony. Id. at 1365 n.3. Without explicitly saying so, the Court seemed to be
alluding to the fact that unsworn testimony is less reliable, as indicated by the "general bar" on
unswom testimony, i.e. evidence law's general hearsay rule. See id.; FED. R. EvID. 801-804 (noting
that out-of-court, and thus presumably unswom, statements are made inadmissible by the general
hearsay rule, unless the statement falls within a hearsay exception that recognizes the hearsay's
reliability). The Court's conclusion that certain unsworn statements, such as statements to the
police, are inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause seems to open the door for the Clause to
also bar other unswom statements that may include non-testimonial statements. See Crawford, 124
S. Ct. at 1375 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that classifying "statements as testimonial
beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions [is] somewhat arbitrary").
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interrogations produce "testimonial" statements other than that they present
the "same risk" as common law-era justice of the peace examinations." 3
Even the term "interrogation" seems subject to debate, because "just as
various definitions of 'testimonial' exist, one can imagine various definitions
of 'interrogation."
3 14
Without setting a uniform standard on these critical terms, the Court
determined that Sylvia Crawford's recorded statement, "knowingly given in
response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable
definition. 3 15  The Court posited several "conceivable" definitions of
"testimonial," but failed to define a so-called "narrow standard," so that
prosecutors and judges might have guidance for those times when the
circumstances surrounding the production of the confession are not so clear,
that is, in times when accomplice confessions are not produced exactly like
the one at issue in Crawford.316
The Court was also unclear on whether the Confrontation Clause is
implicated by non-testimonial hearsay. For example, the Court believed that
a traditionalist focus suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth
Amendment and that, where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, its
admissibility should be subject only to the development of hearsay law.3t 7
The Court also opined that the Confrontation Clause may not be "solely
concerned with testimonial hearsay," implying that certain non-testimonial
material may implicate a defendant's confrontation right, but failing to
delineate which type of hearsay that may be.3t 8
313. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. The risk that Justice Scalia seems to be identifying is that of
"prosecutorial abuse." See id. at 1367 n.7 (noting that government involvement in the production of
statements with "an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse").
314. Id. at 1365 n.4. The Court used the term "interrogation" in a "colloquial, rather than any
technical legal sense." Id. (declining to explain this distinction, but citing to Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)). By doing so, the Court at least indicated a breadth to the term
"interrogation" beyond that described in its jurisprudence involving interrogations where Miranda
rights are involved. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 ("[Tjhe term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect"); see also Michael S. Walsh & Joseph K. Scott II,
U.S. Supreme Court Overrules Ohio v. Roberts, 52 LA BAR J. 38, 39 (2004).
315. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4. See also id. at 1367 n.7 (declining to explain what
"involved" or "with an eye toward trial" means). The Court's point here is undermined by the fact
that even those who joined with the Court in advocating a more traditionalist approach to the
Confrontation Clause doubted whether statements taken by the police were barred by the Clause.
See Amar, supra note 272, at 1049 & n.15 (opining that placing police station confessions in the
category of testimonial or government-produced statements may not be consistent with the
Confrontation Clause's traditional concerns as the confessions are unsworn).
316. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364, 1365 n.4. The Court does appear to exclude, from the
definition of "testimonial," business records, official records, statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy, and casual remarks overheard by a third party. See id. at 1364, 1367; see also Walsh &
Scott m, supra note 314, at 39.
317. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368, 1374.
318. Id. at 1365.
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B. Unavailability and a Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination
The second conclusion that the Court drew from its historical analysis of
the confrontation right was that testimonial hearsay is admissible only when
1) the declarant is unavailable 31 9 and 2) the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
32°
The Court turned to a review of its Confrontation Clause precedent,
noting that the results of many, if not all, of these cases "hew closely" to this
line.321  The Court cited Mattox, Bruton, Lee, White, and even Roberts,
among other cases, to illustrate that the Court consistently excluded prior
testimony and accomplice confessions because the defendant did not have a
prior opportunity to cross-examine or the declarant was not unavailable, and
admitted such hearsay where those factors did exist.
322
Although the results of the Court's decisions have been "faithful to the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause," the Court believed that the
same could not be said of the rationale behind the results.323 While the Court
319. Id. The Court was quick to point out that unavailability is a necessary condition and not
merely a way to establish reliability. Id. at 1366-67. However, the requirement of unavailability has
not normally been used as a factor for reliability, but rather goes to the degree of the prosecution's
need for the evidence balanced against the defendant's right of confrontation. See Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (recognizing that in certain situations, necessity of the evidence
warranted its admission); see also FED. R. EvID. 804 (delineating a list of exceptions for what could
be characterized as "testimonial" hearsay and requiring that the declarant be unavailable). The
requirement of unavailability brings up an interesting issue, with respect to a defendant's forfeiture
of his Confrontation Clause rights, if the prosecution can demonstrate that he has brought about the
declarant's unavailability (e.g. killing a key witness before he has a chance to testify at trial). See
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (accepting a "rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing" on equitable grounds).
If a key witness made non-cross-examined hearsay statements that were crucial to convicting the
defendant, but the witness suddenly disappeared or died before trial without the prosecution's ability
to show that the defendant caused his unavailability, the prosecution is automatically precluded from
using the hearsay statements, no matter how reliable they may be-much to the benefit of the
defendant who may have cleverly concealed his involvement in rendering the witness unavailable.
See id. at 1373-74 (precluding non-cross-examined hearsay statements even if the declarant is
unavailable). This result may be at odds with the policy announced in Mattox, which required a
balancing of the defendant's confrontation rights with the prosecution's need for the evidence. See
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-45 (refusing to allow the defendant to go "scot free simply because death
has closed the mouth of that witness").
320. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365-66 (noting that the common law cases in 1791, the year the
Sixth Amendment was ratified, and the state decisions following ratification, conditioned
admissibility of testimonial hearsay on these two requirements).
321. Id. at 1367-68.
322. Id. at 1367-69. The Court rejected Washington State's argument that Lee created a rule
admitting a confession where it sufficiently "interlocked" with the defendant's. Id. at 1368. The
Court noted that Lee prohibited the admission of an accomplice confession "when the discrepancies
between the statements [were] not insignificant." Id. Washington State argued that the logical
inference from Lee was that, where the discrepancies are insignificant, the accomplice confession is
admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Id. The Crawford Court posited that, if the Lee Court
had meant to announce such an exception for interlocking confessions, "it would not have done so in
such an oblique manner." Id.
323. Id. at 1369. The Court alluded to Justice Breyer's recognition in Lilly that the Roberts Test is
both too broad because it makes a constitutional issue out of every type of hearsay, and too narrow
admitted that the ultimate goal of the Clause is to ensure reliability of the
evidence, reliability is not a substantive guarantee, but a procedural
guarantee that can only be assessed through cross-examination of the
declarant. 324 The Court thus rejected the Roberts Test because it was based
upon "amorphous notions of 'reliability,"' replacing the "constitutionally
prescribed method of assessing reliability" through the "crucible of cross-
examination" with a "mere judicial determination of reliability.""32  The
"vague" and "manipulable" standards and "open-ended balancing tests"
created by the Roberts legacy do violence to the Framers' original intent in
designing the confrontation right and lack any "meaningful protection" in
criminal prosecutions.326 According to the Court's new position, "[w]here
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient
to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
in that testimonial statements are admitted "upon a mere finding of reliability." Id.; see also Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
324. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370.
325. Id. The Court went so far as to compare "dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable" with "[d]ispensing with [a] jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty."
Id. at 1371. Remarkably, Justice Stevens, who now joined Justice Scalia in his re-formulation of the
Confrontation Clause framework, had stated in Lilly that the Court should continue to adhere to
Roberts, because a more restrictive reading of the Confrontation Clause was "foreclosed by [the
Court's] prior cases." Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124. Moreover, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and
Souter, all of whom had, like Justice Stevens, analyzed the Confrontation question in Lilly under the
Roberts framework, now joined with Justice Scalia in abrogating Roberts in favor of Justice Scalia's
new approach. Compare id. at 127, 144 (Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice
Stevens in analyzing the confrontation question under Roberts, and Justice Kennedy joined in the
Chief Justice's Roberts analysis), with Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1356 (Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy, as well as Justice Thomas, joined Justice Scalia in rejecting
Roberts). Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor believed the Court should continue to
apply Roberts. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
The Court cited several lower court cases which used numerous factors to determine when a
statement is reliable. Id. at 1371. While one case considered something to be a "reliability" factor,
another case considered the exact opposite to be a factor in favor of reliability, an inconsistency that
concerned the Court. Id. (comparing, as one example, Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367,
371-72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), which "found a statement more reliable because the witness was in
custody and charged with a crime," with State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002),
which "found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in custody and not a suspect").
Moreover, the Court bemoaned the fact that lower courts "[found] reliability in the very factors that
make the statements testimonial," thus finding an "antidote to the confrontation problem" where the
Clause's demands were most urgent. Id. at 1372.
326. Id. at 1373-74. The Court indicated that the Framers intended to provide criminal defendants
with "meaningful protection" from judicial and prosecutorial abuse. Id. at 1374. According to the
Court, the Framers believed government officers, and specifically judges, could not be trusted to
safeguard the rights of the people. See id. at 1373-74. Thus, the Court believed that the Framers
would have been "loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands" by allowing judges to admit
hearsay without confrontation after deeming a statement "reliable." Id. at 1373. The logical
inference is that the Court's new standard, which does away with judicial determinations of
reliability for confrontation purposes, is founded upon the Framers' deep-seated fear of the
untrustworthiness of eighteenth-century judges and government officers. See id. at 1373-74. In
contrast, the Court's precedent reflected a developing trend away from this view of the
untrustworthiness of judicial officers as it hinged confrontation analysis on judicial determinations of
hearsay reliability. See id. at 1376-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing several of the Court's
precedent over the years that have focused the confrontation question on the reliability of the hearsay
and not on whether it was testimonial or not).
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prescribes: confrontation. 327  In the absence of a prior or current
opportunity for cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause necessarily
calls for courts to preclude the testimonial hearsay altogether rather than
choose "an alternative means of determining reliability.
3 28
In the Crawford case, because the defendant had no prior opportunity to
cross-examine his wife, admission of her testimonial statements violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.329
C. The Chief Justice's Concurring Opinion
The Chief Justice, with whom Justice O'Connor joined, although
concurring in a reversal of the Washington Supreme Court, vigorously
dissented from the Court's decision to overrule Roberts.330 He criticized the
distinction that the Court created between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements as "arbitrary" and out of touch with the Confrontation Clause's
historical roots.33' In studying the common law confrontation right, the
Chief Justice found that the Framers were primarily concerned with the use
of sworn out-of-court statements, such as affidavits and depositions, because
non-testimonial and unsworn statements were not generally used as
substantive evidence in criminal trials.332 In contrast, the Court's past
confrontation doctrine, which extended the confrontation question to all
forms of hearsay, reflected the liberal use of both testimonial and non-
testimonial hearsay as substantive evidence in modem-day trials.
333
327. Id. at 1374. The Court conceded that reliability is a goal of the Confrontation Clause,
lending credit to the lower court cases (and presumably its own precedent) where the courts acted in
"utmost good faith when they found reliability." Id. at 1373.
328. See id. at 1370, 1373. The Court clarified that "[i]t is not enough to point out that most of the
usual safeguards of the adversary process attend the statement, when the single safeguard missing is
the one the Confrontation Clause demands." Id. at 1372.
329. Id. at 1374.
330. Id. at 1374-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
331. Id. at 1374-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice opined that although the
Framers were concerned about certain forms of testimonial statements, there is no indication in the
historical record that they were concerned with the broader category of testimonial statements
described in the majority opinion. Id. at 1375 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
332. Id. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C., concurring). The Chief Justice noted that, under the common
law, out-of-court statements by someone other than the criminal defendant (i.e. hearsay) was not
evidence upon which a conviction could be based, particularly if it was unswom material. Id. at
1374-75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Hearsay was generally only used to corroborate sworn
testimony. Id. at 1374 n. I (citations omitted).
333. Id. at 1375-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing to early confrontation cases which did not
draw a distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements). The Chief Justice saw little
value in "trading our precedent for an imprecise approximation at this late date" when neither the
Supreme Court nor any other court, to his knowledge, had ever drawn the testimonial/non-
testimonial distinction. Id. at 1376 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Moreover, the Chief Justice was not convinced that the Confrontation
Clause should "categorically" exclude testimonial statements.3 At the time
the Constitution was ratified, the principles regarding the admissibility of
hearsay were still developing and the Chief Justice found it implausible that
the Framers would create such a "cut and dried" prohibition on testimonial
evidence when the law during their own time was not entirely settled.335
Instead, the law wisely developed exceptions to confrontation, which were
consistently "derived from the experience that some [hearsay is] just as
reliable as cross-examined in-court testimony due to the circumstances under
which [the statements] were made. 336
Consequently, the Chief Justice would adhere to Ohio v. Roberts as a
framework consistent with these principles.337 Indeed, he found that the
Court did not need to create a new rule in order to overturn the Washington
Supreme Court, but could have adhered to Roberts and its progeny with the
same result. 338 Specifically, he would hold that Idaho v. Wright precluded
the admission of a statement solely because other evidence at trial
corroborated it. 339  As such, Wright foreclosed the Washington Supreme
334. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice found that case law from the period
surrounding the Constitution's ratification was largely inconsistent in its treatment of testimonial
evidence. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). While he generally agreed with the Court that sworn
examinations before justices of the peace were largely excluded under common law, even that rule
had some exceptions. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Furthermore, the common law was less
clear on the admissibility of unswom testimonial statements (which under the Court's Crawford
standard would include confessions during police interrogations). Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
335. Id. at 1376-77 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice further noted that the right of
confrontation, while a "truly important" principle, was never considered absolute. Id. at 1377-78
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) for the
century-old proposition that .'[tihe law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not
be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused').
336. Id. at 1376-77 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (recognizing that "cross-examination is a tool
used to flesh out the truth, not an empty procedure," which promotes reliability in criminal trials).
The Court and the Chief Justice thus both agreed that the Clause's ultimate goal is reliability of the
evidence. Compare id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) with id. at 1373. However, while the Court
stated that there is no substitute for cross-examination, the Chief Justice believed that certain hearsay
is so reliable that cross-examination would be superfluous, a proposition consistent with the Court's
long-standing precedent. Id. at 1377-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527
U.S. 116, 139 (1999); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822-23 (1990). He credited the Court for
excluding at least some hearsay exceptions from its analysis of "testimonial" material, such as
business and official records, because "to hold otherwise would require numerous additional
witnesses without any apparent gain in the truth-seeking process." Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1378.
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Interestingly, the Court's basis for excluding these types of hearsay is
wholly different, reasoning that certain hearsay exceptions were so well-established at the time of
the Constitution's founding that the Framers must have intended to exclude them from the
confrontation right. Id. at 1367.
337. Id. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
338. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
339. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The five justices who changed their positions from
Lilly to join the majority in Crawford were not the only ones to switch sides: the Chief Justice had
joined the dissenters in Wright, which argued that corroboration by other evidence and interlocking
confessions could be used to find reliability under the Confrontation Clause. Wright, 497 U.S. at
827, 832 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun).
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Court's holding that an accomplice confession could be admitted on the
basis that it interlocked with the defendant's own confession.34 °
Moreover, the Chief Justice felt the Court should not so easily overlook
the rule of stare decisis, which commands adherence to past precedent in
order to promote consistent development of the law. 34 1  Furthermore, the
Court's new rule failed to provide critical definitions for the tens of
thousands of prosecutors who need specific and immediate answers on when
a statement is "testimonial. 342
VI. CONCLUSION: CRAWFORD'S IMPACT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR
CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE
If the reliability-focused Roberts Test could be considered an
amorphous framework that produced inconsistent and unpredictable results,
it is unlikely that the Court's current position in Crawford has helped
matters much. 343 It seems that the Court has announced a "non-standard,"
which cuts the lower courts loose, unable to anchor to past confrontation
precedent.344
A. "Testimonial" and "Police Interrogations"
The lower courts must chart their own course in the new waters of the
Court's "testimonial" approach, designing their own ad hoc standards to
determine when a statement is "testimonial" and deciding on a case-by-case
basis when certain hearsay is subject to the restraints of the Sixth
Amendment.345
340. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
341. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Crawford never
mentioned the principle of stare decisis amid the Court's readiness to overrule a case decided
twenty-four years ago. See generally id. Remarkably, less than a year prior, Justice Scalia criticized
the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), for not giving due regard to stare decisis
and for its "readiness to reconsider a decision rendered a mere 17 years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick."
Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
342. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (reminding the Court that "[r]ules
of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the country, and parties should not
be left in the dark in this manner").
343. See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877-78 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (criticizing the Court
for not providing further guidance to the lower courts as to what types of statements are
"testimonial" and noting that the Chief Justice's criticisms of the Court in his concurring opinion are
"apt," if not "understated").
344. See id. at 879 (doubting whether it could rely on the Court's previous holding in White to
affirm the admission of an excited utterance made to a 911 operator, but having minimal direction
from the Court on whether the statement was testimonial and thus whether it should apply the
Court's new rule).
345. See Note by Professor Ohlbaum, I OHLBAUM ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF EVIDENCE 2
(2004) (noting that federal and state courts will have to review and revise its analyses in some cases
when determining the admissibility of different types of hearsay falling under the 804(b) exceptions,
which typically admit testimonial-type statements). One New York court also noted that trial courts
365
Regarding accomplice confessions, it seems the Court provided enough
clarity to determine that confessions made in a classic custodial police
station interrogation will be barred by the Confrontation Clause absent a
prior opportunity for cross-examination and unavailability of the
declarant.34 6
However, the Court's ambiguous position on the definition of
"interrogation" necessarily elicits the question of what exactly constitutes a
police "interrogation" and thus whether an accomplice statement is
"testimonial": What if the accomplice does not know he is a suspect, but
rather believes he is just providing useful information to the police (or for
that matter, to an undercover officer) - is it the accomplice who must
consider himself "interrogated" or is it from the police perspective? 347 What
happens when the accomplice is not "in custody" but gives his statement to a
third party still believing that the information could eventually be used at
trial? 348 Moreover, is it still a "law enforcement" interrogation when an
Internal Revenue Service agent, Securities and Exchange Commission
investigator, or other similar law enforcement agent asks the questions?
349
How many and what kind of questions do the police have to ask before it is
considered an interrogation? 3 0 What if the police at the time do not believe
the information will be useful at trial, but later decide to use it at trial?'
must now "work out" the meaning and application of the Court's new Confrontation Clause
principles. See Mascot, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 876. Lower courts have already begun deciding on a case-
by-case basis whether statements are testimonial or not. Compare Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879-80
(deciding that calls to a 911 operator are not testimonial), and Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945,
952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (deciding that statements made by a victim at the scene of an incident in
response to informal questions by the responding officer are not testimonial), with Moody v. State,
594 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. 2004) (deciding that statements made by witnesses during an officer's
field investigation are testimonial), and United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (S.D. Ind.
2004) (deciding that statements made by a suspect, not in custody and in response to a prosecutor's
questions, are testimonial).
346. Note by Professor Ohlbaum, supra note 345; see also Davis v. United States, 848 A.2d 596,
599 (D.C. 2004) (noting that an accomplice confession taken during police interrogations fit within
the Court's definition of testimonial); State v. Allen, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2764, at * 15 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 17, 2004) (admitting an accomplice custodial confession where the facts were "not
distinguishable from Crawford'); Hale v. State, 139 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (noting
that an accomplice's "written statement made to police during custodial interrogation constitutes
testimonial evidence" and was thus inadmissible without a prior opportunity for cross-examination).
347. See State v. Clark, 598 S.E.2d 213, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the defendant
claimed that statements made by a witness who was not a suspect in the crime, but that were made to
police during a field investigation, violated his confrontation rights).
348. See People v. Cervantes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 782-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that
a non-custodial accomplice confession to a neighbor with the reasonable belief that the neighbor
would report it to the police could qualify under one of the Court's proffered definitions of
testimonial).
349. See Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (involving questioning of an accomplice by an attorney
from the Antitrust Division).
350. See Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952 (distinguishing simple police questioning from
interrogation, which is commonly defined as 'questioning formally or officially"') (quoting THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 711 (3d. ed. 2000)).
351. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1378 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(noting that the Court, by declining to adopt firm standards or definitions for its new "testimonial"
rule, leaves questions unresolved for the thousands of federal and state prosecutors who need the
rules now in order to apply them in criminal prosecutions throughout the country today).
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While the Court announced that it is proposing a better rule, questions
regarding the admissibility of accomplice confessions, let alone the plethora
of other types of hearsay, remain unresolved.
352
The waters are also muddied with respect to admitting accomplice
confessions that are not made in a custodial setting.353  It is not
inconceivable that lower courts will be inconsistent in their determinations
of when certain accomplice confessions are testimonial in custodial settings,
let alone non-custodial settings.354
Furthermore, even if a court determines that an accomplice confession is
non-testimonial, there is no indication whether and to what degree non-
testimonial statements are subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny.355 Four
members of the Court who joined Justice Scalia in Crawford held the
position only five years earlier in Lilly that applying the Confrontation
Clause only to testimonial statements was too narrow a reading of the
Clause. 6  Advocates of a testimonial framework sought to narrow and
352. See id. at 1368. The admissibility of some forms of hearsay remains intact. See 5 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802.05(3)(d) (2d ed.
2004) (finding admissions by defendants and their agents likely remain admissible after Crawford,
as well as statements made during the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy). However, aside
from accomplice confessions, the Court's imprecision in its Crawford standard calls for guesswork
with respect to other forms of hearsay. Id. It is unclear whether statements by victims or witnesses
made to police officers during their field investigations are testimonial. Compare id. § 802.05(e)
(noting that statements by victims, such as those of domestic violence, made to police upon their
arrival at the home are likely testimonial), with Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952 (finding that statements
given in response to police questioning after the police respond to the scene of the incident are not
testimonial). At least two commentators disagreed on whether the dying declaration exception to the
Clause, established in Mattox, remained in tact. Compare Walsh & Scott III, supra note 314, at 39
(Crawford "specifically leaves intact dying declarations"), with Note by Professor Ohlbaum, supra
note 345 (remarking that the Court "did not decide whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an
exception for testimonial dying declarations."). While the Crawford majority mentioned business
and official records as non-testimonial statements, the Court did not address whether official police
records prepared in anticipation of trial could be considered testimonial. See,WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra, at § 802.05(3)(e). Moreover, recordings of 911 telephone calls, typically admissible under an
excited utterance exception, are likely to provide close cases. Id.; see also People v. Moscat, 777
N.Y.S.2d 875, 877-80 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (grappling with the question of whether a victim's call
to a 911 operator, a civilian police employee, is testimonial).
353. See Walsh & Scott III, supra note 314, at 39 (observing that the Court left open the question
of whether "casual remarks would be testimonial if overheard by a police officer in some official
setting").
354. See id. (noting that "the Court did not clearly define testimonial statements," which will pose
"obvious problems" in criminal cases); see also People v. Cervantes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 782 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that a non-custodial confession made in confidence to a third person
could qualify under one of the Court's suggested standards for "testimonial" if the accomplice
reasonably believed his confession would later be used at trial, but finding that the confession was
non-testimonial because it was not similar to the "primary examples" of testimonial statements given
in Crawford).
355. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 352, at § 802.05(4)(a).
356. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined
Justice Stevens on this point). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor also rejected limiting
Confrontation Clause analysis to testimonial statements only. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374-78
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simplify the Confrontation Clause's application, arguing that it should not
concern non-testimonial hearsay and there should be no constitutional
scrutiny with respect to its admissibility. 357 However, it is not entirely clear
whether Crawford actually provides that narrowed application and even
leaves open the possibility that Roberts may still apply to non-testimonial
statements.358
While this is yet another issue that needs resolution,359 the Court seemed
to imply that regardless of whether hearsay law alone determines the
admissibility of non-testimonial statements or if the Roberts Test is still
applied to those statements, both approaches would be acceptable under the
Confrontation Clause.36 °  Were the Court to accept a division in
Confrontation Clause analysis with its new Crawford approach applying
only to testimonial hearsay and the Roberts Test continuing to apply to non-
testimonial hearsay, then the Court's past confrontation precedent might still
have some vitality.361
B. Unavailability and a Prior Opportunity to Cross-Examine
The lower courts have the advantage of precedent, both preceding and
following Roberts, to establish when a declarant is unavailable.362 Where
accomplice confessions are at issue, the accomplice is usually rendered
unavailable because he invokes his Fifth Amendment right against self-
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements in confrontation analysis).
357. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365-66 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating
that the Clause apply only to testimonial material and that statements that are not testimonial be left
to the regulation of hearsay law); Petitioner's Brief, supra note 14, at 42 (advocating a similar
approach and citing Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in White).
358. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 352, at § 802.05(3)(c) (noting that the Crawford opinion
suggested that the Sixth Amendment may apply to non-testimonial statements using the Roberts
framework or not at all). Indeed, following Crawford, some courts continued to apply the Roberts
framework to non-testimonial statements. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 202-05 (Conn.
2004) (applying the Roberts Test to a private, non-custodial accomplice confession); Cervantes, 12
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782-85 (applying a Roberts-like test to a similar accomplice confession).
359. The Court in Crawford conceded that it does "not definitely resolve" whether non-
testimonial hearsay is subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370
(noting that a majority of the Court in White rejected narrowing the Clause's scope to testimonial
statements only, but that White's rejection of such a narrow approach may or may not survive the
Court's holding in Crawford).
360. See id. at 1374 ("[Ilt is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law - as does Roberts, and as would an approach that
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.").
361. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 352, at § 802.05(3)(c) (noting that "it remains to be
seen whether, or how, pre-Crawford decisions on constitutional requirements will continue to apply
to non-testimonial hearsay").
362. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (determining that a three-year old
child's young age rendered her incompetent, and thus unavailable, to testify); Roberts, 448 U.S. at
65-66, 74 (noting that declarant was unavailable after the prosecution's good-faith search to locate
her); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965) (determining that a declarant is unavailable
when he invokes his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). Cases adhering to the
Roberts Test are helpful on this point as unavailability was a requirement under the Roberts Test for
hearsay not falling within a firmly rooted exception. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
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incrimination.363 Because it is clear that invoking the Fifth Amendment
renders a declarant unavailable, courts are unlikely to struggle much with
this requirement.
364
However, the lower courts may struggle with the requirement of a
defendant's prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 365  The
Crawford Court emphasized that the Constitution prescribes cross-
examination as a necessary tool to test the reliability of testimonial
statements,366 but how strenuous or extensive does the prior cross-
examination need to be in order to satisfy the Constitution's mandate? Does
the defendant need to have had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant?3 67  For example, defendants in certain criminal
procedures may not have as strong a motive to develop the declarant's
testimony through cross-examination where the prosecution's burden of
proof is lower. Consider preliminary hearings, where the prosecution often
need only show probable cause, the defendant may reserve his cross-
examination energies for trial where the prosecution's burden of proof is
considerably higher.368 Moreover, admitting a transcript of a prior cross-
examination by someone other than the defendant who had a similar motive
and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant could arguably be
sufficient.369 One such example would be a codefendant who vigorously
cross-examines a declarant accusing both defendants of the crime at the
codefendant's separate trial.
363. Many confrontation cases dealing with accomplice confessions involved accomplices who
invoked the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 121 (1999); Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968); Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420.
364. The Douglas Court's determination that invocation of the Fifth Amendment leads to
unavailability has not been challenged. See Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420. But see State v. Crawford, 54
P.3d 656, 658-60 (Wash. 2002) (spending a good portion of its opinion discussing whether the
defendant Crawford had waived his right of confrontation by invoking the marital privilege and
addressing the issue of whether invoking the marital privilege rendered Sylvia Crawford unavailable
for Confrontation Clause purposes), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 914 (2003), rev'd by 124 S. Ct. 1354
(2004).
365. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367-74 (determining that the defendant must have had a prior
"adequate opportunity to confront the witness," i.e., cross-examination, but failing to define the
parameters of an "adequate" prior opportunity for cross-examination) (emphasis added).
366. Id. at 1373.
367. Evidence law addresses this concern in its hearsay exception for prior testimony. See FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(1) (requiring that, to admit prior testimony, the declarant must be unavailable and the
party against whom the hearsay was offered must have had "an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination").
368. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (Deering 2004) (noting that the defendant may cross-examine
witnesses at a preliminary hearing, but the prosecution need only establish probable cause that the
defendant has committed the felony in order to try the defendant).
369. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) (declaring that a cross-examination by a predecessor in interest
with a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant is sufficient to satisfy the
hearsay exception for prior testimony).
369
C. The Interlock Theory May Still Have Vitality in the Harmless Error
Analysis
An additional area the Court did not address is the harmful error
analysis with which it seemed to struggle in Bruton, Lee, Wright, and other
cases involving corroborating evidence, especially the interlocking
confession issue.3 70 The Crawford Court skipped altogether any evaluation
of whether a violation of the defendant's confrontation rights resulted in
harnless error, because the State did not contest the issue.371 It should not
be so readily assumed from Crawford that the Court has summarily
dismissed the idea that an interlocking confession may go to the issue of
harmless error. The Court made clear that it was doubtful at best whether
Sylvia's statements interlocked with the defendant's own confession and
alluded to the harmful effect of their admission at trial.372 Therefore,
perhaps some vitality remains in the notion raised by the Court's earlier
cases that an accomplice confession that adequately interlocks with the
defendant's own confession may render a confrontation violation
harmless.373
On the whole, it appears the Court has strengthened a defendant's
confrontation rights by mandating cross-examination of declarants who give
testimonial statements and limiting the prosecution's ability to bring key
evidence that may have been readily admissible under the Roberts
framework.374 Consequently, prosecutors may not be able to proceed to trial
370. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text discussing whether the interlocking
confession issue is one of reliability for admissibility purposes or an issue to be addressed in a
harmless error analysis.
371. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 n.l. Although Crawford rejected the use of interlock to
determine the admissibility of the accomplice confession, courts continue to look to the presence of
corroborating evidence to determine whether a Confrontation Clause violation was harmless error.
See, e.g., Hale v. State, 139 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986), for the harmless error factors: "the importance of the witness's testimony;
whether the testimony was cumulative; the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting material points of the witness's testimony; the extent cross-examination was permitted;
and the overall strength of the [prosecution's] case").
372. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373 (discussing the critical differences between Sylvia and the
defendant's custodial statements the night the police questioned them, and emphasizing the
prosecutor's reliance on Sylvia's statements to refute the defendant's self-defense claim).
373. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990) (noting that corroborating evidence could be
used for the harmless-error analysis and suggesting that the Lee Court indicated that interlock
between the defendant's and accomplice's confessions may support a finding of harmless error); Lee
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545-46 (1986) (focusing on the harmfulness of admitting the accomplice
confession that did not sufficiently interlock); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968)
(addressing the concern that admission of an uncorroborated confession by a codefendant added
"substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case").
374. See United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 897-902 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (excluding a non-
custodial confession made by the accomplice against his penal interest without shifting or spreading
blame to the defendant-statements that likely would have carried sufficient particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness under Roberts); see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 352, at §
802.05(3)(e)(g) (noting that the Confrontation Clause now bars the admission of statements that
were traditionally admissible under Roberts without cross-examination, including accomplice
confessions that do not directly implicate the defendant, grand jury testimony, and perhaps
statements by domestic violence victims to the police, certain police records, 911 calls, and
statements by child sexual abuse victims to law enforcement officers).
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without the ability to admit critical hearsay evidence.375 On the other hand,
if the Court has limited the Confrontation Clause analysis to testimonial
statements only, Crawford may restrict a defendant's confrontation rights
with respect to non-testimonial statements, providing no constitutional
analysis to those statements that are admissible under hearsay laws.376
The Court should be credited for its response to increasing concerns
with a problematic Roberts Test.377 Crawford appears to have resolved the
prevalent critique that the Confrontation Clause was too closely tied to
hearsay law, at least with respect to testimonial hearsay where hearsay
exceptions play no role in determining its admissibility under the Clause.378
The Court has also focused the Confrontation Clause analysis on testimonial
statements, as commentators and members of the Court had long
advocated.37 9
The Court's bright-line rule to exclude testimonial statements in the
absence of unavailability and a prior cross-examination may well prove to be
a simpler test in application and produce more consistent results in
confrontation cases.38 ° In the meantime, the Court's position in Crawford is
a prime example of the "amorphous" standard, which the Court critiqued
375. See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (determining that the
prosecution would not be able to proceed to trial if the 911 call by the domestic violence victim
qualified as a testimonial statement).
376. While few and far between, the Roberts framework did result in cases where hearsay,
otherwise admissible under hearsay laws, was precluded on Sixth Amendment grounds. See, e.g.,
Wright, 497 U.S. at 819-24 (holding that hearsay statement was admissible under the state's residual
exception, but it failed to meet the Roberts Test requirement of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness, precluding its admission under the Confrontation Clause).
377. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1371-72 (citing several lower court cases which have admitted
accomplice confessions under the Roberts Test, even though the Lilly Court announced that it was
"highly unlikely" that accomplice confessions were admissible under Roberts); see also Kirst, supra
note 1, at 104-44 (discussing cases following Lilly, which demonstrate that the Roberts Test was
inconsistently applied among the lower courts to admit and preclude accomplice confessions).
378. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text (discussing this critique); Crawford, 124 S. Ct.
at 1370 (severing the Sixth Amendment's link to the "vagaries of the rules of evidence" with respect
to testimonial statements); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 352, at § 802.05(3)(c) (stating that,
under Crawford, hearsay exceptions no longer have the significance they once did under the Roberts
Test). However, those who would apply the Clause to all forms of hearsay may be disappointed
with the Court's seeming position that the hearsay law and not the Confrontation Clause may be the
defendant's only protection against admissibility of non-testimonial hearsay. See Jonakait, supra
note 74, at 589-611 (suggesting that the Confrontation Clause apply to all forms of hearsay that
could be "misweighed" by the jury).
379. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms for the Court's linkage of
hearsay law and the Confrontation Clause). However, the new standard in Crawford remains a rule
governing the admissibility of hearsay, and thus, does not address the problem of confronting
hearsay that happens to be admitted under the Crawford standard. See Douglass, supra note 74, at
195-97 (calling for alternative methods to confront hearsay once it has been admitted at trial).
380. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 n.10 (noting that the Court's new stance will cause only
"interim uncertainty," while the Roberts Test is "inherently, and therefore permanently,
unpredictable").
Roberts for creating.18t Notably, inconsistent application of the Roberts Test
was a primary argument by the Court for abrogating Roberts,382 but the
Court's indefinite stance raises doubts as to whether its new position is
preferable to the Roberts Test, which courts had been applying for over two
decades.383
Without definite standards for determining when a statement is
"testimonial," what constitutes a "police interrogation," when the defendant
has had an "adequate" prior opportunity for cross-examination, and whether
non-testimonial statements are subject to constitutional scrutiny, the lower
courts will continue to struggle with the admissibility of accomplice
confessions, not to mention the multitude of other forms of hearsay, which
prosecutors across the country seek to introduce in criminal trials every day.
It remains to be seen whether and when the Court will solidify a standard
that will prove more workable for lower courts to apply. 4
Kjirstin Graham385
381. See id.
382. See id. at 1371 (citing inconsistent results from the lower courts in their determinations of
what renders a statement "reliable").
383. See id. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that lower courts will have to "guess" at
the scope of the Crawford majority's new rule, calling it a "mistaken change of course").
384. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (stating that the majority's ruling "casts a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials").
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